Being a Bond Holder

Well if someone told me that my bonded security in a company "should willingly" be swapped at 27 ¢ on the dollar for non-securitized common stock I'd tell them to go screw themselves too.

The whole basis of buying corporate bonds instead of corporate common/preferred or corporate grade investment paper is that it is SUPPOSED to be the most secured form of credit ownership an investor can grant to a corporation. Meaning, although you don't get high yields or actual controlling and voting rights, you are supposed to get a guaranteed return of a modest rate and further be protected as a creditor class should the company falter or capitulate.

The US bankruptcy courts have ALWAYS ranked corporate bond holders as the First in line to get payments after the company's debts to suppliers and B to B liabilities. Meaning that if you own anything else other than a corporate bond, and the company goes into bankruptcy, you get paid LAST and often at pennies on the dollar. Because bond holders get the lowest return on their investment & because they have almost no influence on the ownership or operation of the company, they are seen as being the least able to mitigate their loses when a company goes south. Preferred and common stock holders have the ability to dump stocks easily or even force board room changes as well as block the actions of a company before it goes into bankruptcy.

So until now the rock solid rule was that whenever a company enters bankruptcy, after all the company's debts due to operation costs are paid, bondholders get paid in full if possible depending on the liquidity and total amount of assets possessed by the bond holders.

In the case of GM, the bond holders were owed approximately 3 billion in GM debt. GM if entering bankruptcy has in its assets more than enough money to conclusively pay off its debts to suppliers and the UAW and have enough cash and asset value to retire the entire bond debt. Stock holders of course would get squat after the bond holders were paid- but the stock holders could expect to be issued new shares in the company that emerges from bankruptcy, so their losses would only be paper loses assuming GM goes on to survive.

I saw the Treasury enforced offer to buy GM bonds in USA Today last Monday. GM basically said that bond holders would be forcibly converted to shares of common stock by the Treasury. The conversion of bond debt to stock was literally 27¢ on the dollar----FAR BELOW WHAT THEY COULD REASONABLE EXPECT TO GET IN A BANKRUPTCY----and to add insult to injury- although bondholders represented a claim to more than 60% of GM's current net worth, the Treasury had informed GM that the bond holders would not be allowed to collectively be represented at all on a future board whether GM enters bankruptcy or not.

In short the Treasury told GM that if it expects any government money- the bond holders get the shaft. Instead of collectively owning 60% of the asset valuation of GM, bond holders would be reduced to under 2% of the asset values.

Chrysler's fate for its bond holders is even worse. Essentially Obama said if you don't take take a beating and smile you are unAmerican. So if the offer is lose your secured debt, lose your dollar amount on that debt, gain no equity, and get less than 2% liability assets in a new GM or Chrysler or be declared un American I guess your options suck.

In plain English, the Administration has told the bond holder < which thanks to 401 K and mutual funds really means most Americans with conservative investment holding in corporate bonds> take a 83% hit on your investment and be thankful we aren't threatening to prosecute you in court.

This is the biggest sea-change in bankruptcy law in 200 years. And if you are wondering, it represents a direct and hostile corporative seizure by the federal government due to a politicalized policy agenda of the current Administration. For all of you who screamed about the Patriot Act or how malevolently incompetent President Bush was, I hope that you will be equally outraged at what Obama has done in the cases of the automakers and the banking system.

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Military bases and where Local Federal Grants Come Into Play

The unintended negative consequences of military bases as far as economics goes is pretty well documented. In most- but not all- places that have gone through the BRAC process and have then been decommissioned the local economies tend to perform better overall after only a couple of years. For example in my city we have a base closing in about 18 months after having been emplaced for nearly 75 years. The projections as to what the economy will do as a result of not having the military base anymore is that we should see a doubling of economic activity in the immediate area around the base. Further the base will now pay property and sales taxes- something which it hasn't paid for in many years.

And there are other examples in my state as bases have been closed or realigned. Warrner Robbins AFB for example was realigned and the city went into conniptions when it happened. Yet the reduction of base activity has ironically- though not unexpectedly lead to the first economic improvement for the city since the base popped up during World War II.

The perception is that military bases have scads of civilian contractors running about and getting paid to do things for the military so that the military can use its manpower for actual mission and training. The reality however is that unless it is a base like Dobbins AFB in Marietta, Georgia where the facility is actually a shared site with Lockheed-Martin's aircraft assembly plant, there isn't much local employment derived from on base activity. The reality is that while there is some service industry benefits to a local economy- for example the strings of fast food places and bars that abut many military bases, there is little transfer of wealth from the actual cost of the financing of the base to the outlaying economy that the base occupies.

As far as military base distributions you can just look at a military installations map if you want to to see my point. For example in all of New England you have two military installations, Brunswick in Maine and New London Connecticut. In New York you have a single Army base. Then you have Otis AFb in Massachusetts and McGuire in New Jersey. As Senator John Kerry pointed out, Congress and the BRAC process have set up a situation where most military installations now reside in the South and in the West. He found it to be political in that about the only places we now have military bases are those in "red states" or places where the congressional district in an otherwise blue state happens to be red.

To be clear, the BRAC process has largely removed politics from the decision on whether a military base should be maintained or established as well as when they should be shut down. It is also interesting to see that one of the standards by which the determination is made is "community commitment" to the base under review. Often one of the grounds for decommissioning of a base is the determination that the political leaders of a district support a base being maintained or not.

When Moody AFB, Robbins AFB, and Athens Naval Logistics & Supply School facilities were placed under the last round of BRAC, Moody and Robbins were determined to have political leadership support as well as community support. Athen's political leaders did not want their base and the left wing political advocate and activist groups in Athens also did not support the base. In keeping with Senator Kerry's thoughts on the red vs blue placement, Moody and Robbins AFBS happen to be in staunchly red districts. Athens happens to be a blue district in a sea of red.

As far as the South being a beneficiary of having more of the 110 Federal Prisons you are correct 56 of them happen to be in the South with 54 spread across the rest of the country. However the number of Federal Prisoners in total is somewhere north of 200,000 people. That isn't much of an offset, and is even less of an offset when you consider federal prisoners are still considered to be residents of their last state while not incarcerated. Meaning Federal Prisoners don't cant when it comes to determining Congressional representatives allocation by Census.

Before BRAC, Congress members did fight tooth and nails for bases in their districts because given Cold War realities, many voters thought having a military presence in their district was good insurance. I always thought it was kinda a stupid conclusion for people to come to given that ICBM's look at military bases as targets to hit. But there was some justification especially during the Reagan years that military bases were one of the few reliably funded Federal expenditures that could prop up local economies during the late 1970's and early 1980's.

With the fall of the Iron Curtain however, the need for baeses made little sense, and when people started crunching the numbers, often they realized that in an environment of reduced military spending by the Federal Government, the bases were in fact a net drag on local economies. No one in Congress wanted to have to say closing down the local White Elephant was a good idea, so they set up BRAC to let non- politicians make the determination for them. That is why you have seen less Congressional leverage being placed on maintaining bases because now a member of Congress essentially has little say on the process.

As to the differences in Federal outlays in terms of cities

http://www.census.gov/govs/www/estimate06.html

By way of example local Georgia political entities received $1,069,146,000 in direct government funding.

Delaware $64,537,000
Illinois $3,097,223,000
Maine $119,495,000

The breakdowns are interesting and you can indirectly see the funds used by the Federal Government to run Federal facilities at the local level in each state. Note however that this does not mean that that money is part of the local budgets that actually get used by local administrations. Instead for example the existence of a Federal Building will be accounted for in "general public buildings" but often the costs associated with those buildings are what the Federal Government spends to run the building. It does not indicate that the Federal Government gives the money to the local level to run the building on behalf of the Federal Government.

When you start to break out these funds from the total federal expenditure at the local level, you can determine what Federal Funds go directly towards the actual local government level. After you do this you will see that on a generalized basis cities, counties, and municipalities at the local level in the South get less direct money aid than is generally seen in the rest of the country.

Hope that helps.

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Government Action Creates Fair Markets

Actually, it wasn't the government that collectively set labor and health standards. Or for that matter, determined a scope of week weeks, child labor, retirement pensions, profit sharing, or even basic human resource benefits. It was rather the chief efforts of the labor union movements that grew out of the 1870's industrialist cartels and the advent of yellow journalism that brought the excesses of the industrialist cartels to the attention of the emerging middle class.

This point has been argued often and conclusively on Ornery to the point that even people who have strong misgivings or even oppose the current unions today have to admit that the work environment enjoyed by everyone is primarily the result of union activities from the 1900-1950 time range. It was only after unions became a strong political force that the government codified what had already been won by unions for everyone. OSHA would not exist had there not first been unions operating in the private sector demanding employers pay attention to worker safety rights.

As to government reductions in poverty, the CBO has oft notified Congress that the impacts of the social programs that originated with the Great Society have at best plausibly stemmed some poverty. But the unvarnished truth is that the social programs started by and maintained by the government have had no impact on poverty. The periods when people tended to do best more recently include the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton tenures where the growth of the economy combined with reduced social spending actually raised the living standards of the poor in the country and even managed to get people to move beyond Federal poverty standards.

The issue isn't whether the government can mitigate the needs of people on a temporary basis. Because the government can. Look at Katrina and Rita as examples. In unusual circumstances where a free market cannot function, only government action can restore a market and maintain a population until the market recovers. But then again, look at the Katrina and Rita policies that have allowed people to live rent free ever since the hurricanes until now. The unintended consequence of government emergency aid is that the people receiving it often delay or do not even attempt to remove the need for such aid. If you haven't recovered from Katrina or Rita by now, it isn't because the free market has not recovered. It is because you have learned that by your own inaction, the government will secure your needs for you.

What this spending plan amounts to is a mechanism by which disputed or redundant public policy spending items have been bundled together into the ultimate wish list. Cheifly, the items contained in it are those spending items that have Democrat advocates supporting the agendas that are the basis of such spending items. Whether it is a local pork plan to widen a road, build seafaring canoes in Hawaii, or give block grants to ACORN- the majority represents plans and spending agendas that predated President Clinton's declaration that the Era of Big Government was over.

If even Clinton thought these types of spending plans were bad, how then can we now see this jump-start of all things government to be good? If the Patriot Act was a direct attack on our personal freedoms, then surely the stimulus packages of the last 8 months has to represent a direct attack on our market economy and the level of government control that will accrue during the planned disbursement of funds from these plans.

Leia Mais…

German Industrial Tactics

Just some commentary I made over on AI Jane when I came across the most insipid thread I think I have ever read.

Taken from http://ai-jane.org/forums/viewtopic.php?p=76380&highlight=#76380

As to German economics. The German state went from being the most damaged and hyper-inflationary economy in either Europe or the Western Hemisphere to being the only state which entered World War II fully recovered from the World Depression. The numbers are simply staggering in terms of first recovering from the Depression, then to growing in every single sector of the economy prior to the war. The supposition that Germany did not have a good economic model is totally abrogated by the factual performance of the economy, even before September 1939. To put it in perspective 1939 GDP performance of Greater Germany was only duplicated again in post war Germany 1952- and that is in spite of the fact that post war West Germany had 10 million more people and the GDP comparison is adjusted for territorial loses. 

Also astounding was the ability of the German economics during the war from September 1939 to May 1945. Unlike any of its adversaries, Germany did not even adopt a centralized war production management handled by the government until 1943. Despite this, Germany produced impressive gains in the military aspects of its economy- while still performing spectacularly in terms of civilian economic measures and benchmarks. The performance increases after 1943 were unequaled by even the Americans in terms of raw numbers and relative outputs. To say that the German war time economics were not efficient or functionally superior to its adversaries is inaccurate. Even at its greatest extent, Greater Germany still had only a fractional economic scale compared to its multiple enemies. Despite this, Germany managed to create one of the most efficient economic systems ever achieved during war time. The U.S.S.R., U.S.A., and Great Britain had vastly less able systems that compensated on the drawing of economic resources and scales afforded by vast land resources and colonial markets. 

As to the actual military, man for man in actual engagements they were literally off the charts compared to everyone else except the Fins, and were only surpassed in performance in modern times by the performance of the Israelis. The only thing that the Allies had going for them was shear numbers. Especially on the Soviet fronts and to a lesser extent on the U.S.A.fronts, Allied commander's willingness to accept casualty rates of four Allied soldiers per every one dead German speaks greatly to this advantage in numbers and deficiency in tactical planning. 

In terms of arms, the Germans were decades ahead of their enemies. Be it wire guided missiles, TV guided controlled bombs, propulsion systems, surface and sub-surface marine technology, rocketry, jet power, avionics, or even simple bombardment technology- the Germans had the best weapons. The only factors which limited the effectiveness was manpower shortages and the comparatively exposed and limited economic base. 

In most battles that the Germans lost, the deciding factor was always numbers of enemies. Be it Kursk or even the Marshes outside Berlin, the defeats in battle usually resulted directly from the effect of the Allies being absolutely willing to throw troops against German fronts until the Germans ran out of shells and ammunition. It didn't matter for example that in Kursk many German Tank Commanders racked up 20-30 killed opposing tanks. The result in that battle was that most tank crews eventually had to abandon fully functional tanks simply because they ran out of fuel and munitions while fighting. Even by their own admission, the Soviets after action reports on Kursk reveal that most German tanks were not actually defeated or destroyed by Soviet fire. Rather they were abandoned in extreme placement by the Germans. 

So again if you are saying the Germans were ineffectual or not even in the same class as its enemies in battle performance- you are woefully ignorant of the German's military condition. 

And we aren't even touching tactics and doctrine. And what is more frightening is the fact that the Germans did what they did, as effectively as they did, despite being the only combatant in Europe who relied almost exclusively on horse drawn supply trains. 

I could write, but won't write for hours on this subject. The noise ratio to content accuracy on this thread was just so bad that I wanted to point out that several of you are totally clueless and might want to do some research involving primary and secondary historical sources. These tertiary sources posted on this thread are essentially the equivalent of a grade schooler's introduction. 

God what a crap thread.

While there can, and by default, has been an argument put forward that the German weapons systems were ineffectual or worse, that argument rests on assumptions made upon post war political viewpoint. For various reasons, the post war Allies had a vested interest in offering detractions towards their former enemies in Europe while at the same time aggrandizing their own accomplishments. The main political reason for this was that the Allies needed to portray their efforts as ones that were entirely productive and inherently superior to the efforts of either Germany or Italy. This often flew in the face of both facts available as well as eye-witness accounts that were made by actual people who faced the German war machine and its lesser Axis co-belligerants. 

While the T-34 was indeed a very impressive tank in terms of basic design, its actual performance was individually best judged as one based upon opportunistic success rather than any particular merit inherent in its weapon system design. For example, much has been made about its performance against the "generic" German tank. And in such situations, yes the T-34 did very well. But like all statistical data, when you begin looking at what makes up the data, the details become examples of how misleading such claims really are. Against the Panzer Mark II, Mark III, and Mark IV tanks, the T-34 was quite impressive in combat. As well it should, considering it outclassed these Panzers by massive degrees. For example the Mark III Panzers were almost exclusively tanks that had started out in the Czechoslovakian Armed forces, with chassis designed in the mid 1930's, with less than a 6" average armour thickness, and main guns running somewhere between 47-57mm bores. With the T-34 you had a chassis that was less than three years old technology wise, with an average armour thickness of 8", the armour was also sloped, and its main gun was 76mm in bore in most cases. 

In a head to head confrontation, you would hardly expect the lesser generic German tanks to last for even scant minutes. And while the T-34 did chalk up the majority of its kills against the lesser marks of the German tank fleet- the lesser German tanks managed to kill at least 1 T-34 for each 4 tanks the Germans lost. When you acknowledge that fact, the T-34 begins to look less like the superior weapons system it has been portrayed as. When you move up into the ranks of the production series that followed, including Panthers, Tigers, and King Tigers the T-34 becomes almost a suicidal system for its crew. At Kursk for example, where there was a fractional component of Panthers and Tigers, the loss rate of Soviet armour against these German platforms were staggering. With a longer range of fire, better velocity of shell, and superior tactics, Panther and Tiger crews literally demolished T-34 forces. 

At Kursk, The German 9th Army fielded 600 lesser Mark tanks, i.e. Mark III and Mark IV. In addition they had another 200 tanks that would be best classified as field modified. or recovered combat vehicles of non-standard designs. They also held 100 Tiger tanks. Against this, General Rotmistrov had 900 tanks, the majority of which were T-34's to engage the Germans near Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943. It was a case of a centralized Soviet force made up of mostly front line standard tanks against a split German force made up of secondary line tanks. At the very least, one would have to assume that the advantage was entirely favored towards the Soviets. 

In terms of combat starting on the 12th and going into the 14th, the Germans had lost over 300 tanks by the end of the first day. The Soviets had lost a staggering 600. By the end of the 13th, the Soviets had lost another 150. However, by the end of that day the Germans had begun running out of ordinance for the tanks. As time went on through the 14th the Germans although now facing a force of approximately 150 functional Soviet tanks, and still having 600 functional tanks of their own to use simply ran out of fuel and ammo. Combined Soviet Partisan and Armoured forces report that commencing on the evening of the 14th and lasting for two days, nearly 600 German tanks were destroyed by ground troops using demolition charges. 

As it is commonly portrayed in history, nearly 1000 tanks met each other head on at Kursk. The popular history portrays a Soviet T-34 tank army meeting a German Tiger tank army and destroying 900+ while losing almost no Soviet tanks during the exchange. The reality however is that aside from some cherry picking gains on the first day, the Soviets were fundamentally ineffective against a numerically weaker foe fielding far less capable weapons systems. The fact remains that after the first 300 easy kills on day one followed by approximately 150 kills in combat on day two, the Soviets had managed to destroy only 450 German tanks vs the Germans having been able to destroy over 750 Soviet tanks- almost all of which were T-34s. The Soviet tactical victory only came after their enemy essentially ran out of fuel and shells. The T-34 based results amounted to only 450 kills, against a vastly inferior foe. While the Soviet ground troops managed 600 demolition kills against largely non-functional German tanks. 

Its not the popular view, but the reality was that in the greatest tank battle of all time, the T-34 emerged victorious only due to shear numbers and a far greater effectiveness of ground troops with satchel charges. While many routinely point out the superiority of the T-34 based upon this single battle, most overlook the reality that the T-34 performed very poorly in the only measure that matters- combat effectiveness. Of the 100 Tigers in the battle you ask? They averaged 17 kills a piece. And of the 60 Tigers that were lost only five were lost to tank on tank action. The remaining 55 were abandoned in place and lost to demolition charges. 

And that is just the case of the Soviet T-34 being popularly seen by people as an example of how superior Allied weapons systems were compared to Axis systems. The reality however is that these systems worked based upon a simple key factor- limitless supply. Similar performance can be seen with the American Sherman Tank- better known by its crews as "Ronsons" which refers to the Sherman's ability to go up in flames as reliably as the cigarette lighters made by Ronson in the 1940's. A common rule of thumb among Allied tank forces on the Western Front was that you had to have at least four Shermans before you considered taking on a Tiger. And you let the infantry take out any King Tiger. You would be correct in so far as the Ferdinand being a flop. But then they didn't even manage to make 90 of them. And at Kursk they performed extremely well- those that were destroyed were the result of infantry. But the Americans and British who latter faced them in Italy held them in great respect as adversaries. It would be more correct to say that the Ferdinand Tank Destroyer was a failure only in terms of how few of these weapons were built and deployed. Not because they were not effective weapons platforms. 

In terms of the experimental systems, like the V-2 for example, in order to declare them useless requires a massive degree of compartmentalization in terms of judgement. For example were it not for Speer and Heisenburgh jointly deciding to mothball and prevent a nuclear weapon during the last year of the war, the V-2 could have been- and should have been- the most lethal weapon available. For that matter had Speer decided to allow the paradigm shift towards a nuclear weapon- one which Germany was well advanced towards- the V-2 would have effectively stopped the Western Allies. As it was Antwerp and London might disagree with your assessment that the V-2 wasn't effective. It is only because Speer had a moment of humanity that prevented him from allowing a nuclear weapon to be developed, that the V-2 was prevented from reaching its full potential. 

And frankly the numbers of absolutely abysmal Allied weapons systems far outweighs the comparatively few ineffectual Axis systems. For example the British PIAT anti-tank weapon couldn't take out a canvas covered truck- yet they were made in the millions. The panzerschrek by comparison was almost always leathal when it hit its target yet only 15,000 were ever made. The Sten gun was a oft jamming, oft misfiring, and frequently broken weapon. Yet the Allies built millions of them. Compare that to the final Assault rifle variant the Germans came up with. The main difference between Allied failed and suspect weapons systems vs the German systems is almost always one of industrial production. 

For example the 90 Ferdinand tanks are popularly judged to be failures because they were too few in number to have had much of an effect upon the shear numbers arrayed against them. Yet the Sherman- is a success simply because of numbers alone. One on one I'd rather be in a Ferdinand tank destroyer than in any Allied tank. The issue isn't effectiveness but rather odds. If I am in a Ferdinand, aside from a direct assault from behind by infantry, I am almost invincible to attack and can kill anything that is terrestrial based and survive even an air assault. In a Sherman, Patton, Lee, T-34 etc.. I am unlikely to be able to singularly defeat any of my most likely opponents in combat. In mass numbers then I might have a shot. But be honest with yourself would you want to go into battle in something known as a "King Tiger" or a "Ronson"? 

The almost sole reason why Allied forces prevailed, is industrial numbers and a willingness to stick to evolutionary designs despite technical limitations. Why fix a Sherman tank's shortcomings if you can afford losing 4 Shermans to every one King Tiger you take out. You know there are around 1000 King Tigers and multiples of tens of thousands of Shermans. As long as you can afford to put crews in a Sherman, it doesn't matter how bad it is as a weapons system because shear numbers will eventually mathematically eliminate all the King Tigers. 

And such examples go on. But I am out of time

_________________

GDL

Leia Mais…

Is Islamic Terrorism a Threat?

I'd say that Islamic Terrorism is a threat to both your freedom and way of life. If you don't think it matters whether the Middle East- and other African and Asian countries- become wrapped up in Sharia based law or even a Caliphate developing under a Sunni ascendancy, then you are not being reasonable. That such a system could come into existence is not a far fetched possibility. In fact in historical terms, much of the Muslim world was unified under very geographically large and population dense governments. The dictatorships and military juntas that rule in Islamic states today are ripe for replacement having squandered decades of post-European colonial rule with economic, civic, and human rights abuses. By our standards, even the Islamic governments allied with the United States are dreadful examples of exactly how one should not rule a sovereign nation. If you think Islamic terrorism isn't an issue ponder the following.

Egypt's simmering civil war between western leaning politicians and the populist Islamic radical groups goes in the later's favor. How would international trade be effected if the Muslim Brotherhood takes over Egypt? What if they make good on their threat to close Suez travel to all non-Islamic flagged ships? What if they follow through on their threats to eliminate the Coptic Church? What if they follow through on their threat to destroy the "pagan" shrines of the Pharaohs? What if they do indeed gain control of Egypt? 

What will you do if Syria and Lebanon become unchecked tools for Iran? Do you think the terrorists backed by these countries should be allowed to attack Israel without concern from the USA?

Should we not be concerned over the very real possibility that terrorists are more than likely to take over all the Palestinian territories? Gaza seems to be doing rather well despite the fact that the rest of the world has turned it into a virtual pariah.

If Islamic terrorism isn't a big deal and no threat to the USA, we shouldn't be concerned with terrorist groups usurping Somalia, or leading genocidal exterminations of Christians in Sudan?

Of course none of this has any possible negative consequence for ourselves.

If you cannot grasp that Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan,& Philippines are part of an organic, coordinated, & methodical effort by Islamic terrorist groups to establish governments hostile to anything other than devout Sharia based Islamic rules- then there is no point in attempting to get your attention. Does it matter if such things come to pass?

It matters only if you think ideas such as the United Nations Charter on Human Rights are not just words on a piece of paper. If you do not hold such a view, then by all means adopt an isolationist view and leave the world beyond the United States fend for itself.

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Consequences of Withdrawal from Iraq

The least definable result of withdrawal from Iraq by United States lead forces would be prestige. During a war, the parties involved delay the overall political and diplomatic costs derived from military engagement. Depending on the outcome, the increase or decrease to prestige that results is almost exclusively based on the perceived net result. Prestige is simply the perception by other political entities as to the overall capacity of a nation to exert political or diplomatic power. 

In the case of Iraq, the prestige at risk of being gained or lost by the United States is largely dependent on the perception that the Iraq government is fully functional, peaceful, and independent of an overt need to rely on the United States in its functioning. Should we leave before the Iraqi government is fully functional and independent, world opinion will rightly decide that the United States has lost prestige in the process of removing and failing to establish a counter to the former Baathist dictatorship. 

The delayed nature of negative impact for loosing prestige will be huge in many ways. On the economic front, the loss of prestige will likely be reflected in the further decline of the U.S. Dollar’s valuation relative to other currencies. It would not be an unlikely decline to see the dollar exceed a three to one ratio against the Euro. What is more, you would likely see that energy traded globally will no longer be conducted in dollar transactions. There would be other such economic costs, however, these two alone would have a staggering effect on our own domestic economy. The fact that the dollar’s valuation is dependent upon perceived strength of the United States government instead of hard assets backing means that if the government of the United States losses prestige the dollar resultantly will be seen by other economic interests as being less valuable. The alternative outcome of a successful conclusion in Iraq consisting of a stable functional and independent Iraq would result in an increase in prestige for the United States. As a result, the dollar would likely find a level of near parity again with the Euro. Something which has not been seen for several years now.

Another result of an Iraqi withdrawal before a functional and independent Iraqi government is emplaced would be a extreme weakening of diplomatic power for the United States. While some have pointedly argued that the current state of Iraq is already undermining United States diplomatic efforts, the opposite is true. American diplomacy right now is seen as a continuation of the immediate post 9/11 efforts. In practice, this policy has been seen as dogmatic and process driven. The United States has been inflexible in its stances in terms of Global Terrorism, Iranian, and North Korean diplomacy. As long as the United States has remained committed to its involvement in Iraq and achieving its publicly stated goals of installing a free and democratic society, the assumption has been made by the rest of the world diplomatic corps that we also continue our position on terrorism, Iran and North Korea.

Should we withdraw from Iraq before we achieve our publicly stated goals for that country, our other policies concerning terrorism, Iran, and North Korea will become suspect. A decline in diplomatic ability will result from a loss of prestige. The seriousness of our diplomatic demands will become checked by the example that a withdrawal from Iraq would give. Considering the diplomatic needs that the United States would have in the aftermath of a withdrawal, the loss of prestige would dramatically lessen our diplomatic ability to enact such goals. 

Another result of a lessening of prestige would be the issue of legitimacy in terms of reliability and commitment. If we have called for a free, democratic, capitalistic, and defensible Iraq and then leave before that has become reality, then our future commitments will be called into question. For example the support of the Fatah lead Palestinian Authority would be seen by opposition political groups as being wholly dependent upon the United States willingness to endure only certain levels of conflict of bloodshed. Rightly so by using the Iraq withdrawal as an example, such opposition groups could rightly conclude that if a certain threshold of conflict and bloodshed is surpassed the United States would withdraw its support. The permutations of such declines in diplomatic power due to loss of prestige are relatively easy to postulate. What is important is that the American commitments in the Middle East especially would be suspected by all parties. 

In terms of our own penalty for withdrawing on a domestic front, the chief result would be economic. While the globalism we have embraced would lessen the impact of a loss of prestige and its economic consequences, there would still be an overall decline in terms of our GDP potentials comparable to successful Iraqi policy. Domestically sourced and operated enterprises would feel an impact in terms of energy and inflation. While this could be lessened by action of the Federal Reserve Board, the loss of prestige impacting the dollar’s valuation would create a similar economic event as took place following the withdrawal of United States forces and support from South Vietnam. Issues such as a stagnate stock market, expensive lending costs, unemployment, and governmental fiscal crisis would emerge. While temporary in nature, the durations of these effects would likely be longer than that which followed the South Vietnam episode. Of concern is the fact that our national debt, need for international markets, initial weakness of the dollar, and complicit federal deficit budgets are dramatically worse than that which we  had in 1974-75. Add to this the impending Baby Boomer medical and retirement crisis and you have a plausible situation where the United States economy could endure several decades of relative decline instead of the decade of decline we endured after leaving South Vietnam.

However you look at it, the loss of prestige and the debit we collectively would incur by withdrawing from Iraq before our public goals are met is not only an endurable expected result but also a relatively painless result for the United States. It would make our economy weaker, but we are after all the world’s biggest economy. It would make our diplomacy harder, but we are the only super power on the globe and there is only so much resistance that can be made against our diplomatic initiatives. The only difficult cost would be the loss of military initiative within the Middle East because our withdrawal indicates that our willingness to enforce our diplomatic goals and not loose prestige does not outweigh our willingness to commit military force. 

In terms of the Middle East after an Iraqi withdrawal by the United States the proverbial can of worms would result. It is easy to make sweeping predictions. But, these predictions are so easy that the cause and effects of each, complicit with the nature of future elapsed time span makes it very easy to run off a cliff of suppositions. It is much like the creation of alternative histories which have become popular of late. Knowing what did take place in reality, historians can play with what could have happened if a few minor events or personalities behaved differently given the same initial state. It  is easy to figure out what might have happened if a certain Hitler had not survived a gas attack, thus preventing him from ever becoming a political leader. The issue is that sometimes, as you move away from the starting points you can either create an alternate reality that closely mirrors what really did happen or you can create an alternative reality that differs completely from what really happened to such an extent that the alternative becomes laughable. If we are to predict what is likely to happen in the Middle East we have to limit ourselves to very broad guesses. The more general they are, the more valid they can be presumed to be. The more exact we attempt to make them, the more exposed the predictions become to unguessed permutations of events which have yet to take place. What we want is a guess which finds itself somewhere in the middle of events and outcomes with exact dates, names, and consequences and oracles from Delphi.

If the United States pulls out of Iraq without allowing for a Iraqi government that is seen as legitimate by its own people, stable enough to peacefully transfer powers through elections, control commerce and public well being, and defend its internal interest and external borders, the result can be euphemistically referred to as a mess. Assuming none of the United States public policy goals have been met, and it simply withdraws from Iraq, what will result is the development of a factional civil war. While many have made the claim that Iraq is already involved in a civil war, the fact is that it is not currently in such a state. In order for it to be in such a state, the government would have to be using military force against defined adversaries chiefly though actions against civilian populations. What is currently the reality in Iraq is that multiple groups are engaged in tit for tat violence loosely related to regional, tribal, political, and religious affiliations. While there is the occasional spectacular suicide attack or car bomb, the majority of the violent actions in Iraq right now do not fulfill a designed series of military acts entered upon the attainment of political and governmental authority. 

As violent as it may seem now, these clashes between tribal groups and religious sects pales in what would occur if the United States left Iraq now. You could compare a post United States withdrawal Iraqi government to the one left in Kabul by the Soviet Union after its withdrawal from Afghanistan. Except the situation for the Iraqi government in Baghdad would be worse since it does not even control the capitol city. Upon a U.S. withdrawal, the stability and endurance of the Iraqi government would depend almost exclusively upon its own military forces and its willingness to use them to effect control over the rest of the nation. While the government might enjoy the diplomatic recognitions by other countries, the fact is that its military simply does not have the trained manpower nor hardware and logistics required to simultaneously control its territorial integrity nor stamp out internal military threat. The almost inevitable independence of the Kurds in a premature U.S. withdrawal environment would leave the Iraqi government with only a firm control of three to four provinces, and titular control only in the Kurdish provinces. In such a situation, the need of the Iraqi government to exert authority would not coincide with the Kurd desire to be politically independent in addition to the functional independence it now enjoys. 

Faced with this reality, the Iraqi government would have to decide if it is worth the political cost and military risks involved in retaining the Kurdish provinces. Faced with the necessity to battle the Kurdish peshmurga, the fledgling Iraqi army would be unable to reasonably conclude a military operation against the Kurds before it faced internal opposition in the non-Kurd provinces. It is highly unlikely the Kurds would attack outside the provincial borders, but for all intents and purposes Kurd subservience and recognition of the Iraqi government would persist only as long as the Kurds require a diplomatic shield from Turkish or Iranian actions. Be that as it may, the potential security and resources of the Kurdish provinces would be of no benefit to the Iraqi government other than the fact that the Kurds are unlikely to engage in the civil war that should rage in the rest of the Iraqi republic.

The issue of what will likely start a civil war is hard to predict. It could be as simple as a misguided attempt by the Iraqi government to quell Sunni militancy in a manner similar to that employed by the former regime against Shiites. Another plausible igniter would be Al Queada initiating attacks against both Sunni and Shias that exploit ethnic, regional, tribal, and religious differences as is currently the case. The exception however would be that there would not be a U.S. lead response to Al Queada’s acts as there is now. It would require an Iraqi government response which would at best be limited due to manpower and material inadequacies. The point is that for one reason or multiple responses, the Iraqi government would shortly after withdrawal find itself engaged in a factional civil war.

Aside from the Kurds, who would likely endure a civil war only as defenders, the parties to the Iraq civil war would break down into the Shia dominated outlying provinces, Sunni dominated border provinces along the Saudi Arabia border, and an Iraqi government centered around Baghdad and key provincial capitols and ports of entry. Who would win such an engagement is hard to determine. The more protracted the war the more I am inclined to believe that the Shia provinces will be to co-opt the Iraqi government and eventually liquidate the Sunni civilian populations that remain. However, I can equally see Al  Queada taking over the Sunni faction and enlisting Saudi Arabian support that would enable them to eliminate the Iraqi central government and hold the Shia majority faction at bay. In any outcome, Iraq will most probably cease to function as a secular state. It will be unlikely to maintain its economic production, nor maintain even minimal agricultural productivity. It would be a case of transcendent religious factional warfare which would place the Persian Gulf States at odds with the remainder of Arab dominated Middle East countries. It would also allow for Iran to become the de-facto military and economic arbiter of the Middle East.

Assuming that a civil war does break out in Iraq, there would be multiple internal and external consequences.  Of immediate consequence to the Iraqi people would be the penalties imposed upon a nation without government and stability. The infrastructure of a modern state, which in Iraq’s case has undergone damages already, would be expected to collapse. Communication would disappear, meaning reliable commercial activity would cease. The chief economic activity of Iraq would become militancy. On a human scale, the direct deaths from combat as well as the indirect deprivations of refugees, famine, and collapsed medical systems would certainly create suffering beyond that of recent memories. If Darfur is a genocide, the words for what would happen in Iraq have yet to be invented. 

Outside of Iraq, the consequence of a civil war would be felt quickly. The possibility that Basra would continue shipping oil would vanish. Even if the Iraqi government maintains its control of the port city and facilities, the raw oil would almost certainly not be making it to the shipping depots. On a more sinister side, the religious implications of factions engaged in civil war would drive both a moral wedge between the greater worldwide Islamic community. Assuming the engagement is as protracted as I expect it to be, the plausibility of non-Iraqis engaging in sectarian based violence grows exponentially. What effect such bloodshed would have on the Islamic world can only be guessed at. Having sectarian issues at stake, will the region’s other nations simply sit by and do nothing? I suspect that they would not. That leaves the potential for a regional sectarian conflict open and plausible. In such an environment, the very existence of the current Middle Eastern governments becomes very unlikely. States such as Jordan, Egypt, and Syria would find it almost impossible to resist populist sympathies for the various sectarian combatants in Iraq. Populist sentiment would almost require their governments to act in a militant manner in support of the various sides in Iraq, or risk the requirement of having to use force against their own people. If there is a civil war in Iraq, the expectation that such conflict stays inside Iraq alone is very unlikely.

There is a possibility however that somehow the Iraqi government does survive and does prevent a civil war after a U.S. withdrawal. In order for this to happen, there has to be a willingness to prevent the emergence of sectarian militant groups. It is plausible that issues such as oil sharing, representation, and religious accommodations can be resolved so favorably for all major parties that it becomes inherent self-interest to prevent a civil war from happening. It will also require stringent enforcement of the government’s authority. Having lived under Saddam as an example of oppression and also having near universal access to military equipment the people of Iraq would be capable of quickly judging the government and resisting it if it proves ineffectual.  There is a slight possibility that Iraq could operate in a style similar to that of post combat South Korea or some of the post World War II South American nations. Military juntas pay lip service to constitutional authority and law while allowing for economic stability that ultimately leads to a stable enough political landscape that politicians can eventually rule by ballot without needing guns to keep themselves in power. The only issue I see with this slim possibility is that it presumes that there is an Attaturk in Iraq willing to use a unified military command to install a civilian government and protect it until such time as it stands on its own.

Call me a pessimist but I see civil war as the most reasonable outcome. The resultant rump state of Iraq would either be a totally lawless land of sectarian militancy or it would be a religiously based and ideologically purified state. Regardless of the post withdrawal situation in Iraq, the chief benefactor will be the Iranian government. If Iraq finds itself overtaken by a sectarian civil war, Iran is assured of not having any challenge to its Middle East policy, nor would it have to hide its role in encouraging the Shia sects it has been arming, supplying, and providing logistics to. In fact, the need to assure at least a stalemate in an Iraqi civil war would almost certainly assure that Iranian policy would be to circumvent any Sunni security or ascendancy of Al Quaeda leadership and sponsorship of such groups. Additionally the need of Iran’s to do this would also play into its post Islamic Revolutionary goal of thwarting Saudi Arabian influence and support of Sunni religious beliefs. 

If by some chance the Iraqi civil war is not long in duration, settling out in a matter months instead of years, it would imply that restraint of violence directed at non-combatants will have likely occurred. By shear numbers, the Shia would most likely be the ones who could adopt such a strategy and survive as compared to their Sunni adversaries. While the nature of such an implementation by the Shia would most reasonably turn out to be one involving ethnic cleansing and genocide, such a strategy would be of direct benefit to Iran. A Shia led genocide in Iraq would assuredly place that sect on an international judgment of immorality. However, for Iran a Shia ascendancy in Iraq would likely lead to a ideologically favorable situation which would allow for Iran to extend if not its actual political borders, at least create a satellite level of control of the Shia who would be the dominant faction in Iraq. The only downfall for Iran in such a situation would be the assumed actions by Saudi Arabia to support the Sunni majority provinces along its current border with Iraq.  While a military annexation is highly improbable given the limited on ground absorbing capacity of the Saudi army, the Saudi Royal Airforce would be able to prevent an all out dissolution of the Sunni civilian populations. The situation would still remain favorable to the Iranians however, because any military operations conducted by the Saudis would in very short term become reliant upon United States logistics and supply. Something which would be politically unpopular both in the kingdom and also in the Middle East in general. Add to this the fact that ground support for the Sunnis would likely include direct supply of Al Quaeda, which would substantially erode Saudi-United States relations, Iran could be reasonably sure that Saudi support would ultimately fail in terms of preventing Iranian hegemony in the former Iraqi state.

Even if the Iraqi state avoids a general sectarian civil war or a civil war which engenders a genocidal component, and somehow manages to emerge from an United States withdrawal with a functionally unified yet premature government Iran will benefit. Iran can use the comparative weakness of an Iraqi central government as a provocative reason for crossing the borders towards Basra. Such a move could have multiple excuses of initiation. But the likelihood of an Iraqi force being able to withstand an Iranian annexation would be substantially limited. Given the expected weakness of the United States diplomacy and willingness to use military force again in a region so soon after withdrawal, Iran would likely face no real or overt competition to undo its act. Additionally, even if Iran chooses not to engage in an outright annexation, its support of various Shia militant groups in Iraq would continue to be an attractive goal. While further straining whatever central government Iraq would have, the ultimate expectation would be for an Iranian backed Shia insurgency which would propel the Iraqi nation into a general civil war. And as noted above, the outcome will almost certainly benefit the Iranian desire for hegemony. The only real question is how many Iraqis would die in the process.

So you would have an American state suffering diplomatically and economically An Iraqi state left with either a premature government or a varied degreed civil war inside the Iraqi borders. And an Iranian involvement inside those borders with a reasonable goal and chance to implement a friendly Shia state composed of the majority of the former Iraqi territory. What remains to be determined is how the general geo-political situation will turn in the Middle East after a premature United States  withdrawal from Iraq.

Arguably and obviously the one state that benefits most from an American withdrawal is Iran. The time it takes for Iran to establish economic, political, and military hegemony in the region is dependent upon the overall situation in Iraq after an American withdrawal. A worst case scenario for Iran is that the withdrawal of American forces comes only after political, economic, and military stability have been achieved by the Iraqi government. Something that the American voters and media are not likely to support given the low level of popular support for the American contingent in Iraq and the perception of the American people that whatever is happening in Iraq is not  a direct event that accrues any defensive benefit to America as a nation. 

I can hardly argue with this point of view. The ultimate benefits of a free, stable, secular, and democratically ruled Iraq will reveal themselves in terms of decades and not years. While Americans generally agree with the idea that all people should be free, they tend to lose interest in the process when the people we assume to want freedom as we understand it do little obvious effort to indeed make themselves free. In crass terms, the American public has reached a point where they demand a result and a justification for why it should suffer further military casualties when they perceive that the people we are fighting for are showing little positive efforts to help themselves be free. It is all well and good to have someone say that if we succeed in planting a true democracy in the middle of the Middle East  then we could expect many positive things for the peoples of the entire region. But for Americans, that often does not explain why we have to suffer for someone else's benefit.

And it is this inability or unwillingness on the part of America's people that could deal the Iranians a strong hand of cards. The current political infighting in Iraq seems to point to a situation where the withdrawal of American support is already a guaranteed event. The election of a Democrat  to the office of the Presidency in 2008 will almost certainly result in a withdrawal time-table of months. Even if there is a Republican elected, the withdrawal from Iraq will not likely be delayed more than a year of time. For Iran, the ability to influence the American political process is the first card that it has to put into play.

Whether Iraq has a government that is stable, a civil war of short duration, or a civil war which leads to total disintegration of Iraq as a functional state, Iran's methodology can remain what it is right now. Funding, training, and supplying insurgents inside Iraq has allowed it to destabilize the Iraqi state already. By increasing these processes and coordinating them to coincide with the American electoral process, Iran can achieve both weakness inside Iraq and punctuate the political campaigns in America with reminders  of American futility in Iraq. Regardless of which party taking office in 2008, Iran will have been able to create a situational advantage for itself inside Iraq by either emboldening the Shia to usurp the government of Iraq or assure the continued instability of the functions of the Iraqi government so that there has been no net improvement in the metrics that the American voters use to determine their electoral choice. By simply continuing its current policies inside Iraq, Iran assures itself that the least gain is a American President elected by the people to end its Iraqi involvement. The more likely outcome is that not only has it assured a favorable to Iran outcome in the American election, but also prevented any Iraqi unity government from functioning. The tri-fecta for Iran is the two preceding benefits coupled with an actual Shia dominated civil war.

The first card played by Iran was of course fairly easy to predict. It is after all simply a minor extrapolation of its current confirmed activities. That these activities coincide with both the American electoral process and the impending demands by the American voters to withdraw is lucky for Iran's ultimate intents. It is these ultimate intents that we now consider. Assuming that America has withdrawn, and that the Iraqi government remains functionally incapable, on of the first things Iran may do is work with Turkey concerning the Kurds. The current incursions by Turkey into Iraqi territory, and the Iraqi governments acquiescence has placed the Kurd dominated northern part of Iraq further into a political drive for full independence. If the Iraqi government is incapable of protecting its sovereignty, the Kurds have reasons to fear the neighboring border countries of Turkey and Iran. The reason for Turkey currently crossing the border into Iraq's Kurdish provinces is that it is attempting to eliminate bases of operation of Kurd rebels that are involved in a low grade ethnic based civil war inside Turkey.

Turkey and Iran have an historical commonality concerning the Kurds. That commonality is the the Kurds as a people have been attacked routinely by both states. It is one of the reasons why the Kurds were grafted into the Iraqi nation. The simple idea was that alone as a land locked nation, the Kurds would be numerically weaker than its aggressive neighbors. By being included in Iraq, the Kurds were afforded a greater degree of political and military protection than would have otherwise have been the case. Despite this, the Kurd minorities across the border in Iran and Turkey continued suffering oppressive actions against them. And inside Iraq, the Kurds were treated harshly as the Baathist Party treated them as potential internal enemies of the state. With the end of the Gulf War, the autonomy seized by the Kurds has had the result of Kurds in Turkey and Iran attempting to assert political freedom and also an intent to unite with the Iraqi Kurd provinces. Given that the Iraqi Kurd provinces are a razor's edge away from declaring their own outright independence from Iraq, the potentiality of a free Kurd state heightens the plausibility that the Kurds inside Iran and Turkey would seek to unify with a free Kurd state. If the Iraqi central government is in collapse or outright civil war, the Kurds would be faced with having to militarily defend its internal border with the rest of Iraq, and also its borders with Iran and Turkey. In such a situation, would the defacto independent Kurdish provinces in Iraq simply declare full sovereignty? And if they do so, would that result in the one thing both Iran and Turkey have tried to prevent for decades? Namely their own Kurd majority provinces uniting to form an all encompassing Kurdish state for this group of people?

That the Kurds will in all likelihood become independent of Iraq is very plausible as is reflected in the above scenarios concerning the American withdrawal and the aftermath in Iraq as a whole. But given that the Kurds are militarily weak in terms of supply and material could they resist an incursion from the south of Iraqi factions, defend its borders with Turkey and Iran, and also ignore the populist Kurdish people's desire to reunite as one nation? Compared to Turkey's military abilities and Iran's abilities, the Kurds could only enjoy the advantage of home field and a tenacity for guerrilla warfare. In a situation where Iraq has collapsed as an organized nation, and where a Kurd state has emerged, the expectation in Iranian and Turkish controlled ethnically Kurdish territories would come to issue. It is very plausible that these people would rise up against the Turkish and Iranian governments. The Iranians and Turks would have a common goal of maintaining their individual territorial sovereignty. 

Maintaining that sovereignty would best be solved by a permissive exchange of military tactics and strategic cooperation between Turkey and Iran. Obliterating Kurds as a military threat on the joint Turkish and Iranian border would undoubtedly lead to refugees and beaten Kurd rebel forces south into the newly independent Kurd state. At that point, citing the ongoing nature of internal attacks by Kurds against Turkey and Iran, and the lawless nature of Iraq, it can almost be predicted with certainty that the free Kurd state made up of the former Iraqi provinces would be invaded by a joint force of Turkish and Iranian military. Obstensively the goal would be to pacify further unrest and deal with the human refugee crisis. 

I will predict that the Kurds will enjoy a free state for only a brief amount of time. The United States will certainly protest the actions taken by Iran and Turkey. But owing to the American loss of prestige mentioned above and its need to keep its military base in Turkey, the Turks will wind up annexing the Kurd territory it occupies. Iran will also ignore any American threats, and probably present its actions as a humanitarian effort. The benefits of Iran gaining Kurd territory will have to be weighed by Iran to determine if it is better to simply annex the Kurd territory or alternatively declare that they are holding the territory as stewards for the Iraqi government. If the Iraqi government is Shia and besting its Sunni enemies, it is highly probable that Iran would turn over the territory to such an Iraqi government. 

In any case that is likely to be the first true naked power play that Iran would attempt post American withdrawal. Another action which assumes a weak or collapsed Iraqi government is redeeming its territorial claims on its southeastern border with Iraq. If there is no government to contend with, it is almost certain that Iran will take over the regions in Iraq directly connected to its Persian Gulf oil facilities. Even if these facilities are non-functioning due to the fact that nothing is internally transiting Iraqi pipelines, Iran taking these facilities assures that whatever faction in Iraq that takes power will have to be favorable to Iran in order to be able to reclaim the Persian Gulf shipping facilities. While there are alternative pipelines towards the Mediterranean or simply shipping exports via trucks to Jordan, the economic necessity of this territory to Iraq's long term future cannot be ignored by anyone attempting to rule Iraq. Iran will be able to prevent any government  from establishing legitimacy simply by keeping Iraq's historical port of transit out of its control. 

Iran would likely be able to accomplish this very easily. When viewing the alternative between being a prime target in an Iraqi civil war, or sitting out such a war under an Iranian military government. The people would reasonably wait it out under Iranian authority. And again, as was the case concerning what would happen to the Kurds, the Americans would be unable to oppose such an act by Iran. Logistically it would be a nightmarish deployment. The expectation that even Kuwait would allow an American expeditionary force to repel an Iranian incursion into Iraq is highly unlikely. An attempt at a unilateral deployment by American forces from the Persian Gulf would be too tempting an excuse for Iran to declare war on an imperial American act against the Islamic heartland. There is little chance that the world community would challenge the Iranian point of view that this was simply a generous act to protect the future needs of the Iraqi people.

Iran's final card may be the establishment in Iraq of a second Islamic Revolutionary Republic. If Iran has direct occupied control of Iraq's Kurd provinces, controls the Persian Gulf transit facilities, and has enabled the Shia fundamentalist political groups to achieve control of the Iraqi government the plausibility of such an outcome rises dramatically. Given the close ties between the Iraqi Shia populations and Iran's own Shia populations, it is not hard to speculate that a person like Sadr would come out on top of the pile with Iran's direct interventions. At that point further speculation is impossible if you also are trying to be accurately predictive. Can two Islamic Revolutionary states coexist, given the recent history of both nations having been in direct military conflict? I do not know. But I am willing to predict that Iran wants at the very least a neighboring state that cannot impead Iranian goals of becoming the single dominate Islamic state   in the world. It is also reasonable to assume that whatever state does emerge, it will accede to Iranian diplomatic agendas, especially the ones centered around removing the Gulf States from the Saudi Arabian sphere of influence and being the chief determiner of oil market outputs from the region. 

Of the states most likely to object to Iranian card tricks in Iraq, the Saudis are the obvious standout. The generational distrusts that date back hundreds of years, coupled with the differing official religious beliefs, and the extra-territorial competition in the Persian Gulf exacerbate the fallout from an American withdrawal. As I noted earlier, if the Iraqi state falls into a full civil war, the plight of the Sunnis will become a source of problems for the Saudis. At the very least, its own internal clergy may publicly demand the Saudi government to intervene inside Iraq. And assuming the Saudis do, it will be a huge propaganda victory for the Iranians who will then be able to say that the Saudis are acting for America because America is unable to do it itself.

But there are many problems with such an intervention. Aside from air power, the Saudis have one of the least robust armies in the Middle East. Its chief occupation is being glorified security guards for the widely dispersed and isolated oil facilities. The possibility that it could still guard these facilities and also conduct a ground based military operation deep inside Iraq is doubtful. This would not be a deployment like the one in the Gulf War, where there was a patriotic desperation over the possibility that an Iraqi army might sweep into the almost indefensible Saudi territory. Additionally the Saudis wouldn't be able to rely on a multinational military force that was doing the majority of the defense and fighting. This would be a case where the Saudis would have to independently support a defense of Iraqi Sunnis. It is, aside from air support operations, something the Saudis cannot do without placing both internal security and its vast Persian Gulf territorial limit in jeopardy.

A fully deployed Saudi expeditionary force on the Iraqi bordered Sunni areas would leave Saudi Arabia exposed to Iranian intervention in the Persian Gulf. While this would be mitigated by the presence of American naval forces, the willingness of America to unilaterally defend the Persian Gulf for free access would be questionable if such action was seen to be provocative to the Iranians. Having recently withdrawn from Iraq, would the American people permit its leaders to embroil them in another war in the Middle East? It is especially doubtful because getting into an open conflict with Iran to support Saudi Arabia would almost certainly be billed as a war to defend Saudi Arabian oil for American consumers. Would the American people allow its navy to defend Saudi Arabia is it attempted to invade Iraq to prevent Iranian influence? I suspect not.

The Saudis will be much like the Austro-Hungarian Empire was when it entered a war to defend its honor. Internally, it faces the problems of vast wealth for very few, and an existence on the public dole for most of its youthful population. Its religious police and the mosques from which they are sent into the streets preach a religious extremism which debases common activities of life to blasphemy. The royals are balanced on a knifes edge between pushing its people to western economic success and keeping their religiously backed right to rule intact. And like all politically weak absolute monarchies that have gone before them in history, the Saudis will be forced to act so that the perception of their authority is maintained. If they are absolute monarch by religious right, then when the leaders of the religion proclaim that defense of the Iraqi Sunnis is mandatory, the Saudis will have to acceed to those demands or lay bare the fact that their religious authority to rule no longer exists.

Assuming the Saudis do invade Iraq, it will be a short time before Iran may choose to act. This is mostly because the Saudis have an exceptionally short staying power in terms of field deployment. Assuming there is actual combat, Saudi forces will be stretched thin and unable to rectify supply logistics or redeem damaged equipment  and human casualties with replacements. It will be a perfect storm for the Saudi government. Its military deployed to Iraq's civil war torn territory, unable to receive any obvious direct military logistical aid from the United States, dealing with its internal population as religious fervor to support the Sunni cause, and facing its historical enemy across an indefensible border as American naval power cannot intervene the Saudi royal family will be forced to commit itself to an unsustainable policy. I cannot predict how the Saudi government will fall, but I do predict that it will fall. 

The Gulf states will of course adhere to the traditional policy that has always guided them concerning its three big neighbors. Whatever happens in Iraq, the Gulf States will most likely not intervene or involve themselves in the matter at all. Whether Iran manages to assert full dominance over the Persian Gulf, or Saudi Arabia manages to maintain the dual controlled status of the gulf, the Gulf States will continue in the roll of businessmen and commodity distributors. Iran has no overt need to directly intervene in their affairs. Saudi Arab will either continue the current status of relations or be so internally fractured that there is no Saudi policy towards its immediate smaller neighbors. It may turn out that when the Iraq issue finally becomes determined, the Gulf States will be the only friendly territories left in the region as far as the United States is concerned.

So that is what I see as the plausible results of an American withdrawal before the Iraqis are fully capable of independence. It is really not that bad a situation for the United States. A little loss of prestige and an economic downturn that last many years. But it isn't a case of total penalty for America. It means that she essentially finds her ability to intervene in Middle Eastern affairs has collapsed. In terms of the ability to intervene with force it remains undiminished. But in terms of diplomacy and geopolitical probability it is unlikely that she could convince either her own people or the global community that force should be used. It also means that seventy five years worth of diplomatic processes ultimately prove to be failed. In the region, the United States will have only the Gulf States, Israel, and perhapses Egypt as friendly nations. The rest will fall under the sway of an Iranian hegemony. 

Iraq will of course be the biggest loser of all, unless it somehow finds a way to unify under a single stable government that can avoid civil war and function without direct military support from the United States. It is highly unlikely that the Iraq which emerges will even maintain its current territorial borders. Inside Iraq, the Shia will be in control. Whether that means a control based upon ethnic dictatorship is unclear. And the Kurds will most likely again see an independent state fall away from reality. In terms of human suffering, I see something on the scale of Darfur at a minimum. More reasonable would be a prediction of something on the scale of the Congo. The only mercy is that it might only last for a couple of years. But given the nature of armed conflicts in the Middle East that count their durations in decades, Iraq will probably suffer for many years.

Iran of course is already the winner. All it is waiting for is to see just how premature the American withdrawal is and how much additional advantage will accrue to Iran as a result. In a very real sense, withdrawal from Iraq will mark the point at which the United State first went on the defensive in its War on Terror. It will have lost in Iraq, leaving the biggest propaganda potential for its enemies since 9/11. It virtually assures that Iran will have the ability to act unchecked in the region. It also certainly guarantees that Iran will deploy functional missile capable nuclear weapons. It ill be able to parlay its regional hegemony into a legitimate claim to diplomatic power that ranks it as an equal to the leading western democracies.  I have a feeling it will inspire Iran to great things, but in Iran's case great evil will be the results of these great things.

   

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Core Views

1. I am for gun control. Meaning that guns should require a traceable license. That guns should be available. That owners should be trained in their proper uses. That owners should be devoid of criminal history. That owners should be free from medical impairments related to sound judgement. That urban areas should be considered zones where possession of hand and sub-machine based weapons requires further regulation. That gun clubs and hunting clubs are a protected type of association. That arms dealing must be fully regulated and have a paper trail that is available to law enforcement.

2. I believe abortion is ethically and morally wrong. I also believe that abortion cannot be made illegal in our society because of the multiple interpretations by society as to what makes a human life. I think it is prudent to make laws that restrict abortion as a means of routine birth control, as well as severely limit reasonable justifications for allowing abortions in the second and third trimesters. 

3. I agree that the government should act to support the daily needs of its citizens during exceptional hardships such as natural disasters. I also think government should provide for temporary assistance during exceptional economic pressures. I think that in cases of individuals being in persistent indigent support, such people should essentially become wards of the state and stripped of voting rights as long as the state provides for their every day needs. I strongly hold that family and social networks should be the primary care takers of people otherwise unable to care for themselves. 

4. I have no problem with gay civil unions. I do have a problem with such unions being equated to traditional marriage because a gay civil union has zero biological possibility of producing children nor would such a union be subjected to the legal penalties routinely associated with divorce.

5. I'm for taking the surplus mines from WW 1 and WW 2 that we are currently spending millions on to store and destroy and instead place them as a belt along our southern border. It will save the cost on storage and demolition of the mines, be cheaper than a fence, and eliminate the creation of drug tunnels as well as stop the illegal crossing of our border. It also could be done in a matter of weeks vs a matter of years in the case of fence construction.

6. I am against capital punishment because it goes against my religion to conduct lethal punishment if there is an alternative means of permanent incarceration. The Catholic Church does provide that there can be justified capital punishment cases, but it stresses that alternatives are almost always preferable.

7. I think Social Security will collapse on its own. Those who are foolish enough to never consider their financial future and leave such things to government capacities deserve no sympathy. Social Security is currently a political tool used by politicians to tell foolish people not to worry because the government will erase responsibility for providing for yourself.

8. I believe the government should promote individual ability to provide for his own life needs by staying almost completely out of the picture except in exceptional circumstances such as natural disasters or military invasion.

9. Government should be small, with state and local government being prime in terms of civilian conduct. Federal government should be powerful enough to administer trade and commerce, enforce treaty commitments, defend the Republic, and protect Federal Constitutional rights on a national level.

10. I also believe in freedom of religion vs not freedom from religion. We have a pluralistic society where everyone can and will be offended by other groups. This means we have to all have a great degree of respect, acknowledge that religious symbols are present in different forms across many cultures. To require our complete removal of any religious symbol from all public view or contact is unethical and also would reduce public interaction to such extent that society would effectively fragment into enclaves of religious intolerance. 

11. I am for a well regulated private economy, beholden to performance capital needs. I also believe that monopolies should be free to become dominate provided they can persistently meet government performance regulations. The right   of individual ownership and private property is basic and irrevocable without just compensation.

12. I support MLK's viewpoint that people should be judged on their ability- not on their color, family, or ethnicity. The law should allow for free access to all in terms of employment, schooling, and access to government contracts. Those who choose to give opportunity to less able people because of color, family, or ethnicity would quickly find themselves at a competitive disadvantage compared to other organizations who seek people based on superior ability.

13. I think the government needs a national archive, as well as representational art, science, and history museums. I also think NPR is a good thing.

14. Government would engage in research in science- including space. However true commercial based space development should be private sectored. 

15. The war in Iraq is a small theater in our current war. Withdrawal is not an option. 

16. School vouchers work.

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