Simply put the Roman Republic, Roman Empire, and Byzantine Empire < early stages of the latter> were really the first time in human history where the majority of humans on the planet were not worried about being exterminated by the people one valley over to the left if they ever made contact. From about the time Sumer became a going concern, there were enough people concentrated to the point that actual warfare was plausible.
So from the region of Iraq to Egypt on today's map, you had city states at war. And the war was continual and increasingly the focus of more an more peoples. People tended to build up a local population, then kill the next door neighboring city state. It really wasn't until the Republic of Rome began expanding that the largest concentration of people on the globe- i.e. Mediterranean/ Near East were actually living at "peace" By the time of Imperial Rome, unless you lived way far out on the borders of the far North, if you lived within Rome or one of its vassal states, you had a reasonable expectation of living well into your early 70's.
Of course if you lived outside of Rome your life expectancy was only 30 odd years even if you were lucky enough to live in the more advanced Chinese city states or the more laid back principalities of the Indus Valley.
Prior to Rome's dominance, people who lived in the territories that eventually made up Imperial Rome had life expectancies of middle 30's at best for males and late 20's for females on average. Once you had Rome as your overlord you tended to be able to survive as a civilian. After the fall of the Western Empire, life expectancies in the former Roman territory dropped back to what it had been before the Roman Republic. Same thing happened with the Eastern Empire. As it contracted in size, those that lived outside its territories suffered a precipitous fall in life expectancy.
So the Pax Romana can be accurately determined by simply looking at life expectancy. For a very long time even before Rome ruled the world, the Romans had substantially longer lives than their neighbors. The expansion in physical territory combined with the explosion of populations as they came under Roman rule marks the beginning of the Pax Romana. The end can be determined by reversing the standards.
Being fair, Rome had a PAX that lasted at least 300 years. A fairer argument would be that the Pax lasted at least 600 years for the majority of people living from Gibraltar to the borders of India & from the Baltic Sea to the northern limit of the Saharan Desert. Compared to what came before and after, the Pax was most definitely a "peace" It would be almost 700 years before a majority of the world's population enjoyed Roman standards of life expectancy under Pax Britannia. That doesn't mean the people who benefited from the PAX in both instances were either Roman or British.
What it means is that the influence of any particular Pax often is greater and longer than the geographical and temporal extant of a leading power. Gibbon may have judged Rome to be at its zenith for 200 years, but the actual impact on peacefulness lasted far longer.
With the collapse of Rome the effects of the Pax evaporated. Then again when the Pax Britannia collapsed we had two World Wars that made the Napoleonic Wars look like a nursery game. You have to wonder that if we are indeed in a Pax Americana, and that when a Pax collapses it is followed by an amazingly intense period of open conflict and plunging life expectancies as a universal rule of human history----what will the post Pax Americana world go through before the next great power?
Monday, April 6, 2009
Pax Americana
Thursday, October 11, 2007
German Industrial Tactics
Just some commentary I made over on AI Jane when I came across the most insipid thread I think I have ever read.
Taken from http://ai-jane.org/forums/viewtopic.php?p=76380&highlight=#76380
As to German economics. The German state went from being the most damaged and hyper-inflationary economy in either Europe or the Western Hemisphere to being the only state which entered World War II fully recovered from the World Depression. The numbers are simply staggering in terms of first recovering from the Depression, then to growing in every single sector of the economy prior to the war. The supposition that Germany did not have a good economic model is totally abrogated by the factual performance of the economy, even before September 1939. To put it in perspective 1939 GDP performance of Greater Germany was only duplicated again in post war Germany 1952- and that is in spite of the fact that post war West Germany had 10 million more people and the GDP comparison is adjusted for territorial loses.
Also astounding was the ability of the German economics during the war from September 1939 to May 1945. Unlike any of its adversaries, Germany did not even adopt a centralized war production management handled by the government until 1943. Despite this, Germany produced impressive gains in the military aspects of its economy- while still performing spectacularly in terms of civilian economic measures and benchmarks. The performance increases after 1943 were unequaled by even the Americans in terms of raw numbers and relative outputs. To say that the German war time economics were not efficient or functionally superior to its adversaries is inaccurate. Even at its greatest extent, Greater Germany still had only a fractional economic scale compared to its multiple enemies. Despite this, Germany managed to create one of the most efficient economic systems ever achieved during war time. The U.S.S.R., U.S.A., and Great Britain had vastly less able systems that compensated on the drawing of economic resources and scales afforded by vast land resources and colonial markets.
As to the actual military, man for man in actual engagements they were literally off the charts compared to everyone else except the Fins, and were only surpassed in performance in modern times by the performance of the Israelis. The only thing that the Allies had going for them was shear numbers. Especially on the Soviet fronts and to a lesser extent on the U.S.A.fronts, Allied commander's willingness to accept casualty rates of four Allied soldiers per every one dead German speaks greatly to this advantage in numbers and deficiency in tactical planning.
In terms of arms, the Germans were decades ahead of their enemies. Be it wire guided missiles, TV guided controlled bombs, propulsion systems, surface and sub-surface marine technology, rocketry, jet power, avionics, or even simple bombardment technology- the Germans had the best weapons. The only factors which limited the effectiveness was manpower shortages and the comparatively exposed and limited economic base.
In most battles that the Germans lost, the deciding factor was always numbers of enemies. Be it Kursk or even the Marshes outside Berlin, the defeats in battle usually resulted directly from the effect of the Allies being absolutely willing to throw troops against German fronts until the Germans ran out of shells and ammunition. It didn't matter for example that in Kursk many German Tank Commanders racked up 20-30 killed opposing tanks. The result in that battle was that most tank crews eventually had to abandon fully functional tanks simply because they ran out of fuel and munitions while fighting. Even by their own admission, the Soviets after action reports on Kursk reveal that most German tanks were not actually defeated or destroyed by Soviet fire. Rather they were abandoned in extreme placement by the Germans.
So again if you are saying the Germans were ineffectual or not even in the same class as its enemies in battle performance- you are woefully ignorant of the German's military condition.
And we aren't even touching tactics and doctrine. And what is more frightening is the fact that the Germans did what they did, as effectively as they did, despite being the only combatant in Europe who relied almost exclusively on horse drawn supply trains.
I could write, but won't write for hours on this subject. The noise ratio to content accuracy on this thread was just so bad that I wanted to point out that several of you are totally clueless and might want to do some research involving primary and secondary historical sources. These tertiary sources posted on this thread are essentially the equivalent of a grade schooler's introduction.
God what a crap thread.
While there can, and by default, has been an argument put forward that the German weapons systems were ineffectual or worse, that argument rests on assumptions made upon post war political viewpoint. For various reasons, the post war Allies had a vested interest in offering detractions towards their former enemies in Europe while at the same time aggrandizing their own accomplishments. The main political reason for this was that the Allies needed to portray their efforts as ones that were entirely productive and inherently superior to the efforts of either Germany or Italy. This often flew in the face of both facts available as well as eye-witness accounts that were made by actual people who faced the German war machine and its lesser Axis co-belligerants.
While the T-34 was indeed a very impressive tank in terms of basic design, its actual performance was individually best judged as one based upon opportunistic success rather than any particular merit inherent in its weapon system design. For example, much has been made about its performance against the "generic" German tank. And in such situations, yes the T-34 did very well. But like all statistical data, when you begin looking at what makes up the data, the details become examples of how misleading such claims really are. Against the Panzer Mark II, Mark III, and Mark IV tanks, the T-34 was quite impressive in combat. As well it should, considering it outclassed these Panzers by massive degrees. For example the Mark III Panzers were almost exclusively tanks that had started out in the Czechoslovakian Armed forces, with chassis designed in the mid 1930's, with less than a 6" average armour thickness, and main guns running somewhere between 47-57mm bores. With the T-34 you had a chassis that was less than three years old technology wise, with an average armour thickness of 8", the armour was also sloped, and its main gun was 76mm in bore in most cases.
In a head to head confrontation, you would hardly expect the lesser generic German tanks to last for even scant minutes. And while the T-34 did chalk up the majority of its kills against the lesser marks of the German tank fleet- the lesser German tanks managed to kill at least 1 T-34 for each 4 tanks the Germans lost. When you acknowledge that fact, the T-34 begins to look less like the superior weapons system it has been portrayed as. When you move up into the ranks of the production series that followed, including Panthers, Tigers, and King Tigers the T-34 becomes almost a suicidal system for its crew. At Kursk for example, where there was a fractional component of Panthers and Tigers, the loss rate of Soviet armour against these German platforms were staggering. With a longer range of fire, better velocity of shell, and superior tactics, Panther and Tiger crews literally demolished T-34 forces.
At Kursk, The German 9th Army fielded 600 lesser Mark tanks, i.e. Mark III and Mark IV. In addition they had another 200 tanks that would be best classified as field modified. or recovered combat vehicles of non-standard designs. They also held 100 Tiger tanks. Against this, General Rotmistrov had 900 tanks, the majority of which were T-34's to engage the Germans near Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943. It was a case of a centralized Soviet force made up of mostly front line standard tanks against a split German force made up of secondary line tanks. At the very least, one would have to assume that the advantage was entirely favored towards the Soviets.
In terms of combat starting on the 12th and going into the 14th, the Germans had lost over 300 tanks by the end of the first day. The Soviets had lost a staggering 600. By the end of the 13th, the Soviets had lost another 150. However, by the end of that day the Germans had begun running out of ordinance for the tanks. As time went on through the 14th the Germans although now facing a force of approximately 150 functional Soviet tanks, and still having 600 functional tanks of their own to use simply ran out of fuel and ammo. Combined Soviet Partisan and Armoured forces report that commencing on the evening of the 14th and lasting for two days, nearly 600 German tanks were destroyed by ground troops using demolition charges.
As it is commonly portrayed in history, nearly 1000 tanks met each other head on at Kursk. The popular history portrays a Soviet T-34 tank army meeting a German Tiger tank army and destroying 900+ while losing almost no Soviet tanks during the exchange. The reality however is that aside from some cherry picking gains on the first day, the Soviets were fundamentally ineffective against a numerically weaker foe fielding far less capable weapons systems. The fact remains that after the first 300 easy kills on day one followed by approximately 150 kills in combat on day two, the Soviets had managed to destroy only 450 German tanks vs the Germans having been able to destroy over 750 Soviet tanks- almost all of which were T-34s. The Soviet tactical victory only came after their enemy essentially ran out of fuel and shells. The T-34 based results amounted to only 450 kills, against a vastly inferior foe. While the Soviet ground troops managed 600 demolition kills against largely non-functional German tanks.
Its not the popular view, but the reality was that in the greatest tank battle of all time, the T-34 emerged victorious only due to shear numbers and a far greater effectiveness of ground troops with satchel charges. While many routinely point out the superiority of the T-34 based upon this single battle, most overlook the reality that the T-34 performed very poorly in the only measure that matters- combat effectiveness. Of the 100 Tigers in the battle you ask? They averaged 17 kills a piece. And of the 60 Tigers that were lost only five were lost to tank on tank action. The remaining 55 were abandoned in place and lost to demolition charges.
And that is just the case of the Soviet T-34 being popularly seen by people as an example of how superior Allied weapons systems were compared to Axis systems. The reality however is that these systems worked based upon a simple key factor- limitless supply. Similar performance can be seen with the American Sherman Tank- better known by its crews as "Ronsons" which refers to the Sherman's ability to go up in flames as reliably as the cigarette lighters made by Ronson in the 1940's. A common rule of thumb among Allied tank forces on the Western Front was that you had to have at least four Shermans before you considered taking on a Tiger. And you let the infantry take out any King Tiger. You would be correct in so far as the Ferdinand being a flop. But then they didn't even manage to make 90 of them. And at Kursk they performed extremely well- those that were destroyed were the result of infantry. But the Americans and British who latter faced them in Italy held them in great respect as adversaries. It would be more correct to say that the Ferdinand Tank Destroyer was a failure only in terms of how few of these weapons were built and deployed. Not because they were not effective weapons platforms.
In terms of the experimental systems, like the V-2 for example, in order to declare them useless requires a massive degree of compartmentalization in terms of judgement. For example were it not for Speer and Heisenburgh jointly deciding to mothball and prevent a nuclear weapon during the last year of the war, the V-2 could have been- and should have been- the most lethal weapon available. For that matter had Speer decided to allow the paradigm shift towards a nuclear weapon- one which Germany was well advanced towards- the V-2 would have effectively stopped the Western Allies. As it was Antwerp and London might disagree with your assessment that the V-2 wasn't effective. It is only because Speer had a moment of humanity that prevented him from allowing a nuclear weapon to be developed, that the V-2 was prevented from reaching its full potential.
And frankly the numbers of absolutely abysmal Allied weapons systems far outweighs the comparatively few ineffectual Axis systems. For example the British PIAT anti-tank weapon couldn't take out a canvas covered truck- yet they were made in the millions. The panzerschrek by comparison was almost always leathal when it hit its target yet only 15,000 were ever made. The Sten gun was a oft jamming, oft misfiring, and frequently broken weapon. Yet the Allies built millions of them. Compare that to the final Assault rifle variant the Germans came up with. The main difference between Allied failed and suspect weapons systems vs the German systems is almost always one of industrial production.
For example the 90 Ferdinand tanks are popularly judged to be failures because they were too few in number to have had much of an effect upon the shear numbers arrayed against them. Yet the Sherman- is a success simply because of numbers alone. One on one I'd rather be in a Ferdinand tank destroyer than in any Allied tank. The issue isn't effectiveness but rather odds. If I am in a Ferdinand, aside from a direct assault from behind by infantry, I am almost invincible to attack and can kill anything that is terrestrial based and survive even an air assault. In a Sherman, Patton, Lee, T-34 etc.. I am unlikely to be able to singularly defeat any of my most likely opponents in combat. In mass numbers then I might have a shot. But be honest with yourself would you want to go into battle in something known as a "King Tiger" or a "Ronson"?
The almost sole reason why Allied forces prevailed, is industrial numbers and a willingness to stick to evolutionary designs despite technical limitations. Why fix a Sherman tank's shortcomings if you can afford losing 4 Shermans to every one King Tiger you take out. You know there are around 1000 King Tigers and multiples of tens of thousands of Shermans. As long as you can afford to put crews in a Sherman, it doesn't matter how bad it is as a weapons system because shear numbers will eventually mathematically eliminate all the King Tigers.
And such examples go on. But I am out of time
_________________
GDL
Leia Mais…Sunday, July 29, 2007
Rebuttal for U.S.A.
Text in green is false claims made by someone blaming the USA for all of Iran's problems.
In summer of 1941 Britain and the USSR invaded Iran to prevent Iran from allying with the Axis powers - Contextually inaccurate.
The Allies occupied Iran, securing a supply line to Russia, Iran's petroleum infrastructure, and forced the Shah to abdicate in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
-Contextually inaccurate. Allies did not militarily occupy Iran, did establish a land link to the Crimea Front, and had little if any Iranian oil infrastructure to take over. MRP was installed to prevent an Axis favorable monarch mush as had been done to prevent the same in Iraq.
In 1951, a nationalist politician, Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh rose to prominence in Iran and was elected Prime Minister.
-Contextually inaccurate. Shah choose him as an advocate for modernization along Western Democratic lines.
As Prime Minister, Mossadegh became enormously popular in Iran by nationalizing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later British Petroleum, BP) which controlled the country's oil reserves.
-Contextually inaccurate. The PM was using the issues of class in a socialist inspired scheme to install at the very least a pro-Soviet government. Nationalizing the oil contracts was seen as a key step to disabling the monarchy, the parliament, the business classes, and pro-western modernists goals.
Britain embargoed Iranian oil and began plotting to depose Mossadegh.
-Contextually inaccurate. The embargo was installed because the British taxpayer had indirectly contributed millions of Pounds to developing and installing the post World War II Iranian oil industry. Prior to the British investment, the Iranian output of oil was negligible and undeveloped. The embargo was intended to force Iran to at least honor the costs which had been incurred in developing the Iranian oil industry.
Members of the British Intelligence Service invited the United States to join them, convincing U.S. President Eisenhower that Mossadegh was reliant on the Tudeh (Communist) Party to stay in power.
-Contextually inaccurate. The PM was actively engaged in preventing western styled programs for development. The political debate in Iran was framed as the Shah being the advocate for the way of the European and an implied corruption. While the PM was the champion for a socialist development more in keeping with Islamic ways, therefor a pure path. The Iranian monarchy began facing violence and political instability at the hands of the Iranian communists who were the chief supporters of the PM's policies. Realizing this, Churchill advocated that the USA better step up to bat for the monarch if it expected to ever see a modern Iranian state friendly to the west.
In 1953, President Eisenhower authorized Operation Ajax, and the CIA took the lead in overthrowing Mossadegh and supporting a U.S.-friendly monarch; and for which the U.S. Government apologized in 2000.
-Contextually inaccurate and already answered by me "Prime Minister Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh, with backing from Communist members of Parliament sought to punish the Shah for having repelled the Soviets from Iran in 1945-46. O do so, the Prime Minister nationalized the country's oil industry on March 15, 1951. Over the next two years, the Prime Minister continued his installation of socialist/Stalinist programs. This culminated in the Shah taking a stand finally and officially dismissed the PM. The PM in turn attempted to depose the Shah and arrest his family and royalists. The Shah was forced to flee on August 16, 1953. By August 22, 1953 the Shah had returned after the people, members of parliament, and intellectuals who agreed with modernizing Iran decided that they were not quite ready for a Stalinist regime in Iran closely allied with the Soviet Union."
Need I go on?
Leia Mais…Thursday, April 5, 2007
Pre 9-11 mentality
I was one who thought Islam would become a problem before 9-11. I got into a very heated debate with a member on Ornery over the source of problems which we should be able to change but were
I think I pointed out that the Arab vs. Israeli problem would disintegrate into a real shooting war if the Palestinian Authority wasn't held to task economically and politically. I think I pointed out that Syria's support of Hezbollah would eventually develop into a proxy war with Israel. I think I also pointed out that Iran would be hell bent on developing both its nuclear program and their naval power.
Gee I guess I was pretty spot on.
Of course I blew the whole WMD issue in Iraq, and have found it very hard to take in the fact that Syria and Iran are doing their damnedest to keep very porous borders.
Point is, few people wanted to even recognize either the trends or the scope of the Islamic world's problems. One member was adamant that if we just stayed completely out of their affairs they would develop along a peaceful and prosperous path. Most people supported her argument.
Bush hasn't done some things right. But at least some small fraction of the American public now recognizes that there are enduring penalties based on how we choose to deal with the Middle East, and Islamic powers in general. It has taken, in some cases 50 years for the chickens to come home to roost. But we should dismiss from our perception that the world has not changed fundamentally. For it has. Islamic aggression is becoming focused outward against the rest of the world.
9-11 just made that fact obvious to the most willfully ignorant, but most people are content to hit the snooze button again.
Friday, January 27, 2006
Roman & Jewish Politics
Two thousand years ago, the Senate and the People of Rome commanded general Titus who would soon become emperor to reduce the rebellious client kingdom of Judea to include destroying the Temple of Jerusalem. The Temple, which had been rebuilt in 516 B.C. following the conquest twenty years after Cyrus of Babylon, was reduced to ashes and left in the condition we see it in today. What is important to note about this event is that Roman handling of the aftermath of the fall of Jerusalem was an incomplete resolution unique among those peoples the Romans conquered. Titus, fresh from his victory in Jerusalem, returned triumphant to Rome and became an Emperor, and did not see to the final subjugations that normally followed the crushing of a vassal state. Surely many Jews were sent to die fighting gladiatorial deaths in Caesarea, or languish in the mines of the Sinai, but for the most part, the Jews were left to their own devices, limited only by edicts against practicing their religion overtly in public. Unlike most people conquered by Rome, there was not the systematic disintegration of the Jewish culture and society that would erase both their cultural identity and cohesion as an ethnic group.
It would be a harsh judgment against Rome to place sole responsibility for an historical act, which reached through history to dog modern times. Cyrus and his subjugation had resulted in the first dispersal of Jews to ancient metropolitan centers. These outposts of Jewish culture served as havens for Jews in the aftermath of Jerusalem’s conquest after the rebellion of 66 A.D. Unlike most ancient people conquered by Rome, the Jews had far flung places to escape to continue their culture. Moreover, from a Roman perspective, the less Jews in Judea, regardless of why, was simply better to administrate. By the time of the last revolt against Rome in 115 A.D., far more Jews lived outside the province’s borders than those who were rebelling against Rome did. Following the last Jewish revolt, so few Jews were left in the decimated province that the Roman administrators tried to put a fresh face on the problematic province by renaming it Syria Palestina and expand the administrative boundaries that reduced the Jews to a minority in their own lands.
After 115 A.D., Jews found themselves in a position of strange equilibrium in the Roman state. Outside of their ancestral lands, Jewish communities held political and economic influence that assured them the freedom to continue their cultural identity. Inside Syria Palestina, they were a mere footnote to the concerns of the Roman administrators. Lacking the economic and political influence needed to behave independent of Roman control, the Jews in their homeland found themselves reduced to being allowed to approach the former site of the Temple only on the anniversary of its destruction. Otherwise, Roman administrators had no further concerns about the Jews living in the province. What the Jews remaining in the homeland were able to do is exert a profound control of the religious life of the Jewish people worldwide. Talmudic interpretations and teachings all originated in Jerusalem’s Jewish community. Exporting religious dogma to the far-flung centers of the Roman Empire, the religious leadership in Jerusalem provided the far-flung members of their culture with a guidance, which did not necessitate the need for a secular state. While Jerusalem remained a strong center of importance for acts of faith, the dispersed Jewish culture uniquely divorced itself from the need to share a centralized geography centered on Jerusalem and the former boundaries of the ancient Jewish kingdoms. By removing political power from the Jews and providing a peaceful cosmopolitan secular environment, the Romans had in effect allowed the Jews to flourish in spite of the fact that they were now officially a conquered and stateless people.
Jewish political power would continue in this manner far after the fall of the Western Roman Empire, and the Byzantine Empire. Strong in places such as Spain, Greece and Babylon, weak in the ancestral homeland. Even the conquest by the Muslims in the 700’s of much of the former Roman lands did little to change Jewish life. The official governments that the Jews lived under changed, but their cultural identity continued to flourish secularly, and the flow of religious intangibles from Jerusalem continued unabated. For hundreds of years, the Jewish worldview was one, which did not require a homeland. Because their homeland existed more as an ideal of faith, bolstered by the fact that the Jews who had remained in Jerusalem provided the religious faithful with an imperative which focused on the long view of fully controlling Jerusalem and rebuilding the Temple, the urgency for Jews to return from far flung geographies did not exist.
As the centuries passed, Jews would suffer localized pogroms and expulsions. Nevertheless, through it all, many more Jews prospered than declined. By the time of the Twentieth century, Jews in many parts of the world had begun to self identify themselves as being dual citizens. The first was being a citizen of the secular nation and countrymen they existed with, and the second was a trans-national identity as a Jew. Events of the century would eventually challenge this modern Jewish perspective.
While Christianity and Islam had at times attacked Judaism, by the start of the Twentieth Century, most Jews found themselves in a world, which largely tolerated the cultural and religious practices of Jews. The rise of modern secular politics and statecraft however would place the historical pattern of Jewish life since Roman conquest into question. Nationalism in Europe would finally place the existence of Jews as a cohesive culture dispersed throughout many nations into the question of political loyalties. How could a Jewish community be considered loyal to a national identity when they still also held a trans-national identity focused on a city and a long lost Temple? Nationalist began taking the ancient Jewish phrase, “Next year, Jerusalem!” as evidence of an inherent disloyalty. Czarist Russia and Eastern Europe states resorted to the time honored practices of pogroms and deportations. However, even Western European states began to take actions against Jews. Episodes such as the French Dreyfus case had become an increasingly more common event. The frequency became so pronounced that faced with pogroms in the east, and governmentally sanctioned discrimination in the west, many Jews began asking the valid question of whether it was time for Jews to not only hold Jerusalem as its spiritual homeland, but also the secular homeland for all Jews.
Theodor Herzel convened a Jewish congress in Basle, Switzerland in 1897. The aftermath of the conference was that the congress declared that Jews should begin to adopt the policy of Zionism. Zionism was officially declared to “... establish for the Jewish people a publicly and legally assured home in Palestine.” What Zionism was was simply monumental. After 1837 years, some Jews had placed into question the strategy of dispersal, which had served them so well since the Roman conquest. The contention was that the world, having become less tolerant of Jews, could not be depended on to not engage in Thirteenth century reactions such as pogroms. If the dawn of the Twentieth century still was an environment ripe for such actions against Jews, only a modern Jewish secular state could shield the Jewish people from deprecations by non-Jews.
Not surprisingly, Jews around the world responded to the 1897 declaration with ambivalence. From an historical perspective, Jews looked at the world and by comparative judgment found that while deprecations against Jews still happened, it paled in scope and ferocity. The post Roman conquest strategy of secular and economic integration with independent religious identity seemed to still offer the best survival strategy for the Jewish culture and people. In an age of ultra-nationalism, Zionism was quickly identified by both many Jews and non-Jews as reactionary and extreme. Zionism would require the Jewish peoples from around the world to return to a land that was lacking in almost all respects. While many Jews said “Next year, Jerusalem!” aloud, most silently added “God forbid!” The very idea of returning to their ancestral homeland was also looked down upon by the Jews who already lived there. If all the Jews returned to Jerusalem, the poverty of the land would be magnified to such an extent that no one could possibly survive.
Unlike the other ancient peoples of the world conquered by Rome, the Jews had managed to do the unthinkable. Instead of advancing as a military force, they had invaded Rome and its far-flung provinces with thousands of independent communities, which excelled at exploiting the relative freedom that resulted from the Pax Romanum and maintain an unique cultural cohesion. Maintaining a separate cultural identity encamped in multiple geographies had enabled Jews to weather any temporary storm. To adopt Zionism seemed to offer a path that would result in such a weak country that hostile acts against Jews would affect all the Jews because they had foolishly chosen to concentrate in one spot on the globe. Zionism’s goals seemed incompatible with reality because it seemingly would result in the creation of an impoverished people and abandon the survival strategy, which had assured Jews a reasonable protection against mass hostility.
By the start of World War I, Jews were finding it increasingly difficult to balance their secular loyalties to their individual nation states, while still embracing the Jewish culture and religious identity. For some, especially those in the Western democracies, being Jewish mattered only when they were in their synagogue. However, once the war broke out, being Jewish could have unforeseen consequences. Most armies had either written regulations or unwritten practices, which prohibited Jews from equally serving their countries. While other religious faiths found no boundaries to contributing to the war efforts, Jews were often barred from service, or so restricted in performance of their service that the end result was that a Jew was seen first as a potential traitor to a Jewish conspiracy, and only secondly as a potential countryman. Modern warfare had brought to the forefront the issue of Jewish loyalty in a way that nationalism had only hinted at previously. Cheated of rank and right to advancement, many Jews in the conflict began to question their own loyalties with good reason. Many Jews realized that their countrymen determined Jewish loyalty and patriotism solely by whether the Jew in question was alive or dead. A living Jew was suspected. A dead Jew in a trench had proven with a bullet his patriotism.
While it is hard for many people today to recognize the importance of nationalism and self-identity concepts during the First World War, the post war impact on Zionism was immense. Jews had recognized that across the trench lines of combat, they had in effect committed fratricide against their religious brethren. For a culture and society, which had always maintained the primacy of their religious self-identity, this was a troubling sacrilege. A worse indignity was the realization that not only did your fellow countrymen distrust you while in the trenches or working at a factory for the national cause, they were very likely to distrust your national patriotism and your true intentions. For the Allies, Jews were war mongerers responsible for the set backs they suffered at the hands of the Central Powers. For Czarist Russia, the blame was placed on the Bolshevik and Jewish menace. For the fall of Palestine, the Ottomans blamed the Jews. For the humiliation of the Armistice, the Germans blamed Jewish junior officers failing Prussian generals. The collapse of Austro-Hungary was blamed in part on Jewish advisers and bankers. The obvious trend to any Jew was that if there was some sort of national setback, Jews were likely scapegoats. Moreover, despite facts and reality, non-Jews thought such conspiracies at best possible and at worst Zionism writ large.
Zionism’s cause was given a huge boost to legitimacy by the United Kingdom’s Balfour Declaration in 1917, and the establishment of the British Mandate in the Trans-Jordan. In it’s most important part the Balfour Declaration made it official Imperial policy to establish “... a National Home for the Jewish people...” and that this new National Home would be created “... in Palestine...” and this is where the question of ownership of the Trans-Jordan and Palestine in particular became a modern concern. What had been viewed justly as a wasteland inhabited by a mongrel mix of descendants of various occupiers and die hard Jews now became important because it now had the potential of becoming the secular nation for all Jews.
Post war popular opinion among Jews about their security living dispersed across many nations, Zionism’s stated purpose, and Imperial Britain’s declaration of a favorable policy concerning Jews leads to a radical change of heart. Jews began to return to Jerusalem. Between 1929-1935, the British Administration gave legal permits to 159,820 Jews. By some accounts between 1918 and 1929, both legal and undocumented Jewish immigration had been as high as 800,000 people. Whatever the actual number, it was significant for two reasons. First, it was significant because it provided tangible evidence that Zionism’s stated goal was in harmony with modern Jewish actions. People were voting with their feet in a substantial way. The second reason for significance is that the sudden return of the Jews took non-Jews living in the Trans-Jordan by surprise.
For want of a better phrase, “Who do these Jews think they are?” probably sums up the non-Jewish inhabitant’s thoughts of the immigrants now flooding British Mandate. While the Jews had always been a large number of the overall population, they had always been the minority group that had no political potential, let alone economic. The Jews that lived in Palestine were just as impoverished as everyone else and seemed more preoccupied with the spiritual rather than the temporal realms of politics and economics. Having been washed in an impressive series of tides of war, the only constant of the region that could be depended on was the Jews weathering whomever the latest occupier was while they went about keeping largely to themselves and dreaming of a rebuilt Temple. This might strike the reader as a trite statement, but the reality is that although most Jews lived outside their ancestral homeland, Jews as a minority had maintained a presence in their homeland, which survived while all other groups, which tried to occupy Palestine, faded away to obscurity. For further consideration, refer to the following list;
135 A.D. Romans citizens were given the lion’s share of the Jewish lands.
330 A.D. Byzantine Christians were given the Latin Roman’s lands.
614 A.D. Persians briefly took the lands from the Byzantine Christians.
628 A.D. Byzantine Christian Heretics took the lands back from Persians.
636 A.D. Moslems from the Arabian Peninsula took the lands.
661 A.D. Umayyads from Syria took it from the Arabian Moslems.
750 A.D. Abbasids, ethnic Persians from Baghdad take over, occasionally loosing control off and on until 1258 A.D.
868 -969 A.D. Tulunids from Syria & Ikhshids from Egypt swap control with the Abbasids.
969-1171 A.D. Fatimids from first Egypt, and then Tunisia wrangle with the Abbasids.
1171-1250 A.D. Ayyubid Syrians and Khurds wrangle with the near terminal Abbasid Persians for control.
1250-1517 A.D. Turkish Bahri pretty much strangle the other ethnic groups and keep it until their decedents loose it in 1918 to Great Britain.
Also, consider this list of occupiers who were less successful but still managed to claim part of Palestine for a time;
1055-1092 A.D. Seljuk Turks held some of the land while fighting both the Abbasids and Fatimids.
1097-1291 A.D. Crusaders from Catholic Europe, including English, French, Dutch, Spanish, Italian etc.
1258 A.D. Mongolian Tartars swept through destroying anything Abbasidian in nature, but left the Jews alone.
1402 A.D. Tamerlane’s Mongols swept through and like their cousins, destroyed anything related to the Turkish Bahri, but left the Jews alone.
Not counting the various European nationalities that had occupied Palestine; at least seventeen different ethnic groups had wrangled over the Palestinian land for 1884 years, yet not one had managed to exert any kind of parlance in terms of social continuity. The exception of course being the Jews. When the British government attempted to conduct a census in 1936 to figure out who was who and where they were, they were faced with an impossible task. The Jews in the region were easy to census and were estimated at 600,000. The Christians, although self-identifying as Roman Catholic, Byzantine, Coptic, and Ethiopian and even further differentiated by national origin, were lumped together and amounted to 150,000. When the British began to census, the adherents to Islam the frustration only grew. Faced with large sects of Sunni, Shiite, and Sufi adherents, not to mention a score of other obscure sects of Islam such as Wahhabism, and national origins from every single Islamic land, the administrators declared anyone who was Islamic living in the Palestinian mandate to be a Palestinian. Having lumped them all together, the British found they had 1,090,000 copies of the newly coined nationality. To further complicate matters they found themselves having to figure out what to do with an additional 15,000 people who claimed no religious affiliation. One can sense the British frustration, which resulted in these non-religious people also being declared to be Palestinians.
The census was part of an attempt by the government to figure out how to create an ethnically segregated and administered federal system for Palestine. The problem was that the overly simplified results of their census ignored the fact that far from being a monolithic block of citizens with common cause, the so-called “Palestinian” simply did not exist. When realistically broken down along religious factions and national origins, the Palestinian majority was in fact a series of ideologically different groups geographically scattered across the mandate that shared almost no common interest. What had been created by the stroke of a pen was a coalition of minorities masquerading as a super-majority of the population. The British were faced with the reality that while Jews had been dismissed for centuries as a minority in their ancestral homeland, they really represented the single largest cultural, ethnic, and religious group. Moreover, unlike their neighbors, the Jews were a cohesive group, well concentrated across Palestine’s geography, and shared common political, cultural, and economic goals.
By having presumed that the Jews were a minority, the British had found it initially easy to allow Jewish immigration in 1918. In fact they had promoted it and increased the allowed yearly quota substantially as the years passed. It had never occurred to them that Jews, though numerically a minority on paper, were actually a majority in function due to their social cohesion. While non-Jewish immigration quotas far surpassed the Jewish quota, the non-Jewish immigrants represented more than thirty other cultural and ethnic groups with little if any common interests. An immigrant from Syria for example would already be dissimilar to one from Tunisia in secular terms, not to mention possible differences in theology. This dissimilitude made the idea of a federalized Palestine unworkable. The Jews were everywhere, in strong-networked communities across the entire Palestine Mandate. The so-called Palestinians were sporadically concentrated; divided by ethnic origins, cultures, and language; and further distanced from each other due to religious beliefs. Having opened the floodgates to Jews at only a trickle compared to the allowed immigration of non-Jews into the Palestinian mandate, the actual impact of the Jewish immigration was as if a dike had burst during a flood.
While many historians debate the conduct of Great Britain during its administration of the Trans-Jordan in general, and Palestine in particular, the only lasting shortcoming the British exhibited in my estimation was not facing the reality that their census confirmed in 1936 what should have been obvious to anyone walking around Palestine. Palestine was Jewish, and had always been. Creating a federal state would have required the extraction of Jews to artificially create zones for the non-Jews exclusive rights, and that the zones would have had to have been further divided to take into account the thirty odd combinations of ethnic, cultural and religious affiliations of the non-Jews. They privately realized this, yet publicly continued to pursue the policy of federalized equality.
Having nothing in common, appeals to “Arab” and “Islamic” leadership to be part of the process were doomed to failure. The British found themselves often-inviting Jewish leaders and the “Palestinian” leaders to conferences, only to have the Jews simply send a letter stating Palestine already is a Jewish state, while no “Palestinian” leadership even appeared or said anything at all. English dogged determinism probably allowed them to ignore the pre-existing reality of Jewish presence in Palestine and ignore the obvious lack of a Palestinian leadership because Palestinian people were an artificial English creation that simplified a census report. It was in bad faith that Britain conducted a policy it knew could not bear fruit during the interim years between the World Wars. The Jews were not about to accept a federal system, which would require their forced removal. In addition, the Palestinians, being an artificial pen-stroke, had neither the cohesion to produce a central leadership nor the common cause to believe a federal system was even possible. About the only thing the non-Jews could agree on was that the Jews were not to be allowed to immigrate, and that the non-Jews would not have to deal with a created, independent Jewish state. The United Kingdom basically ignored the whole issue by dictating it’s famous series of White Papers, each one even more disagreeable than its predecessor as far as Jew and non-Jew alike was concerned.
The United Kingdom probably could have continued its process of unilateral declarations and un-attended conferences aimed at solving what to do with Palestine for decades. However, ultra-nationalism, a World War, a genocide of proportions unimagined, and a post war aggression against what was left of Europe’s Jews all conspired to compress a process that might have lasted for decades into events that snowballed into a handful of years. The post World War II situation in Europe was one of particular devastation for Jews. The horror of the Genocide by the Nazis, the Soviet purges of Jews during and after the war, and the inexplicable reactions of countless towns across Europe, which were expelling what Jews remained, created an environment of refugees unable to find any relief.
The United Kingdom, warn out from six years of global combat, still found itself dealing with the problematic inheritance of 1918. Palestine and the White Paper solution unilaterally declared by the British could not have been more distorted reflections of each other. Perhaps many decades of British administration of the Palestinian Mandate might have resulted in the development of a true Palestinian identity mature enough to enter into a dual federal state with the Jews. However, the harsh reality of hundreds of thousands of Jews with refugee status in Europe placed statehood for Jews at the forefront of Zionist political diplomatic efforts. The Biltmore Declaration by Zionist activists in the United States, President Trumann’s call for the United Kingdom to allow 100,000 Jews to immigrate, and the British final federal plan being declared dead on arrival by the British themselves meant that the impetus for a Jewish state achieved a critical mass among the Jews to return to Palestine.
The results of the United Kingdom returning the responsibility for the Palestine Mandate to the League of Nations’ successor, The United Nations, opened a window of opportunity for Zionists both inside and outside Palestine to make their own political choices for the first time in nearly 2000 years. British indifference and its concerns with other Commonwealth nations created a power vacuum. Palestinian leadership was still in its infancy and was no credible force that might prevent the formation of a Jewish state, or even prevent the change of the status quo. The influx of European Jews, with their economic resources, education, and commitment to forging a secular state for Jews overwhelmed any last ditch diplomatic moves made by either the departing United Kingdom nor the still infant United Nations. By 1948, the Jews declared the statehood of Israel.
Since Israeli actions are currently offered in historical perspective nightly on cable and network news, let alone the reams of paper that are currently devoted to discussions about Israel, the author of this paper will allow the reader to find out the historical events which soon followed. What interests this author is the reality of the Jews having shrugged off nearly 2000 years of political behavior and shed the Roman solution for a permanent nation state. Closely associated with that is the reality of the Palestinian people as refugees unwilling or unable to grasp statehood.
To say that the creation of Israel was a monumental turning point in the Jewish world is still an understatement. For a people to avoid having a nation state to call their own and still exist for so long a period of time is virtually unheard of. Other nomadic peoples had existed without a geographically ridged notion of nation state. However, they had also never approached the cultural developments or success of the stateless Jews. Mongols, Goths and Huns may have made a splash on the histories of other nations, but all faded to nothing. The abandonment by Jews of their unique strategy for cultural survival and sudden reversal of centuries of habit makes the creation of Israel spectacular.
The post war lethargy of the United Kingdom and desperate conditions of Jews outside of Palestine are the most readily apparent causes for the Jewish change in political tendencies. What is more important however is the fact that the Jews were already in Palestine long before any Palestine Mandate was created by a pen stroke. There was no other place on earth where a Jewish state could have been created. Simply put, there was no other place available where Jewish culture was already as prevalent and already practiced, that also had the resources available to absorb the return of the Diaspora. Zionist goals became reality in Palestine only because the Jewish cultural traditions had never forgotten where the people had come from, and it had always maintained a close association with the Jews who had never left Palestine. By remembering the dual facts that Jews had once all lived in Palestine and that some had kept the candle lit by remaining behind, the recreation of a Jewish state was possible. Had their ancestral origins become mythic or had the remaining Jews of Palestine been exterminated by one of the many military invasions of Palestine, even the calamities visited on the Jews during World War II probably could not have compelled Jews to abandon the Roman strategy of survival. However, unlike the past when the land’s limitations had been seemingly insurmountable, having immigrant Jews with high levels of education, economic resources, and improved technological abilities from Europe made the creation of an independent Jewish state plausible.
The nation of Israel was a plausible solution from a Jewish perspective because it had endured ex-corporal as a nation removed from Palestine, but left a ready-made skeleton behind in Palestine. This is why the traditionally reluctant Jews adopted the Zionist goals as their own. Zionism, as a radical ultra nationalistic movement had been seen by most Jews as too radical just a generation before. However, the new generation was able to flesh out the skeleton in Palestine because the concept of return was as strong as it had always been and still repudiate the ultra nationalistic Zionism that had moved beyond the original goals of 1897. The Jews recognized the logic of Zionism concerning nationhood yet also saw the obvious, Palestine was already Jewish. Israel came to reflect Jewish cultural history rather than the radical Zionist policies, which were reactionary and viewed the whole world as enemies. Had there not been an immediate war conducted by contingents of every single Islamic nation against the new nation of Israel, Zionism very likely would have died in 1948. Instead, Islamic forces, both internal and external contributed to the continuation of some of the worst aspects of Zionism resulting in a polarization of Jewish opinion both inside and outside Israel’s borders immediately following the creation of the state.
This polarization of Jewish modern thought is also reflected in the aftermath of 1948 on the non-Jewish population of Palestine. Throughout this paper, there has been an emphasis on the concept that outside the Jewish population of Palestine, there have been waves of peoples who have come to Palestine and ultimately vanished as an identifiable group. The British census of 1936 was provided as the definitive reality concerning who lived in Palestine before the creation of Israel. But for the frustration of British Administrator’s pen, “Palestinian” had no meaning as a defining term for the population. The only qualification to be declared “Palestinian” was to not be a Jew. Before 1948, “Palestinian” was meaningless. Israel’s formal declaration of nationhood and the resultant attack by the Islamic states hardened Jewish resolve for political independence while also having unintended results for the non-Jews of the now truncated Palestine Mandate.
Jewish political development after the statehood declaration was faced with a reality of aggression by Islamic nations. It is not surprising that Zionism, and its contention that the world was set on destruction of the Jews, gained some legitimacy beyond the idea of a secular Jewish state. Specific concessions and adoption of militancy and distrust of non-Jews were some examples immediately after the state was founded. While it could be argued that Zionism was adopted simply due to the environment of politics and military aggression against Israel, the mainstream adoption of Zionism as state policy would complicate Israel’s interactions with its neighbors. The chief complication was the view by non-Jews that Israeli political goals were ultra national and embraced the militaristic components of Zionism.
The non-Jews of Palestine were exhorted both inside and outside Palestine to support the destruction of the Jewish state. Having had little in common except the desire to prevent any Jewish state from being created, this appeal was largely supported. Expecting the combined Islamic forces to easily destroy the Israeli military and liquidate the infant Jewish government, many non-Jews removed themselves from the battle zone. The crushing defeats of the Islamic forces suddenly left hundreds of thousands of non-Jews with refugee status. The defeats of the Islamic forces were explained to be the result of careful Zionist plans after decades of British collusion. However, the most surprising outcome of the creation of Israel was that the non-Jews of Palestine were disowned by the Islamic governments. Having done what they had been asked to do by their erstwhile liberators, the Palestinian peoples found themselves left holding an empty bag of unfulfilled promises.
The non-Jews found themselves between two hostile forces. On the one hand, they faced Israel and the defacto Zionism that was helping shape the new nation. On the other hand, the non-Jews found themselves blockaded from entrance into the neighboring Islamic countries. What was worse was the Islamic governments denying some refugees from even returning to lands still controlled by Islamic forces in the former Palestine Mandate. The appeals for the elimination of the Jewish state by the refugees were deflected by the Islamic governments that were unwilling to risk another defeat. Having called for non-Jews to clear the battlefield, they Islamic governments refused responsibility for the refugees. What had been created was a class of people not able to return to their native lands due to the existence of Israel and the Islamic governments that had attacked Israel.
Until 1948, the term Palestinian had been an empty descriptor, but now the refugees were legitimizing the use of the term. Denied emigration into the lands now controlled by Israel, nor into the lands still controlled by Israel’s neighbors, the refugees began using the term Palestinian to identify themselves. The refugees found that their stateless situation required at the very least a political identification. Palestinian interests chiefly concerned themselves with the Right of Return to their abandoned homes, and a repudiation of the Israeli state. Like the Jews hundreds of years before, the Palestinian, people found themselves disposed by a military force. The interesting development is that the Palestinian political development resulted in the growth of an actual cultural system.
The Palestinian refugees, like their Jewish predecessors, had no political power over their territorial situation. They also had a problem combating Israeli control of religious sites holy to other religions. The access to Islamic sites, as well as the Christian sites in Jerusalem was completely permitted by the Israeli government. This removed the religious component of a cause for action against the Israeli state. The radical improvement and development of the lands and resources of Israel also flew in the face Palestinian claims that the now occupied lands had worth only to Palestinians since the land was impoverished and resource less. Like the census of 1936, the Palestinian identity was still artificial because the identification was still an exclusionary term. If you were a Palestinian, you were not a Jew and were a refugee isolated in encampments bordering the battle lines between Israel and its aggressive neighbors. What was needed was an alternative focus to galvanize the refugees.
The focus turns out to be anti-Zionism. The attacks by Islamic nations against Israel would repeatedly reinforce this focus. On the Israeli side, each act of Islamic aggression would reinforce Zionism as a motive factor in Israeli governmental actions. For the Palestinians, each Israeli success created evidence of worldwide conspiracy. Zionism was responsible for the support of Israel economically and politically. Zionism was responsible for the inexplicable defeats of the Islamic forces. Zionism was responsible for the unwillingness of Islamic states to support the refugees in their demands for settling alternate lands until the ultimate Islamic victory. Without Zionism to act as glue to focus the Palestinian cohesion, the Palestinians would have eventually been dispersed by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees. Nevertheless, by using anti-Zionism as its reason for identification, the Palestinians became a solidified and culturally distinct people.
This brings us back to the Roman solution of Jewish survival. Eighteen centuries of habit are hard to overcome. The decline of Islamic military aggression since the 1970’s has also removed the impact of Zionism as a motive force in Israel’s political process. The original goal of Zionism, the creation of Israel, has been met. Now, the need for an exclusively Jewish state for all Jews has become less strong. Jewish communities worldwide have a level of security unthinkable even fifty years ago. Zionism in terms of being a radical Jewish universal goal has again become what it was at the start of the Twentieth century, a splinter movement among radicals. Jews worldwide have accepted the Israeli state, but feel no particular compulsion to return. Having achieved Zionism’s goal, Jews in the remainder of the world have again reverted to the Roman solution. An Israeli Jew is as much a dual national as an American Jew or a French Jew. The importance of Zionism now only matters to the Palestinians.
Having conquered by force multiple territories of the former Palestinian Mandate from Islamic nations, Israel finds itself not needing them for two reasons. The first reason is that the Israeli state does not have to deal with waves of immigrants seeking to fulfill Zionism’s original goal. Secondly, having the continued existence of an impoverished refugee nation on its borders threatens the stability and safety of Israel. If the Jewish population worldwide had not begun to again adopt the Roman solution, the idea of giving back Palestinian territories would not be feasible. Moreover, far from being a benefit to Israel, the perception of Zionism is actually now a threat because it has emboldened radical elements among Palestinians.
Palestinian demands for statehood and Right of Return have been at the forefront of their demands for decades. Just as the British found a federal solution unfeasible in the 1930’s and 1940’s, the artificial solution of a federated state is still unworkable today. The political leadership of the Palestinians recognizes this, but has been unable to compromise on these two issues because it is one of the few reasons for their political power. Further evidence of this problem is the existence of the proxy aggression of the Islamic world through radical Palestinian groups. Even in the most idealistic and perfect environment, the Palestinian demands could not be met. What the Palestinian leadership is left with is a falsehood to champion and Zionism to blame. It has also left Israel holding on to more than it can handle, since having held on to the captured territories it has provided an excuse for Palestinian aggression and intransigence.
If the Jews of the world were still returning enmass to Israel, the state of Israel could justify its continued holding of the territory because the augmentation of its population would outweigh the aggressions of the Palestinians. The territorial possession by Israel is an historical fait accompli. The standing of Israel’s army has ensured its continued existence and ownership of the territories. There is no readily apparent military force in the region, which could likely change this situation. Moreover, while the stateless situation of the Palestinians is lamentable, it is not the responsibility of the Israeli government to concern themselves with what happens with refugees that owe their existence to an hostility to Israel and its people. What responsibility the Israeli government does have however, is the long-term security of its citizens.
Without any sudden change in Jewish habits regarding returning to Israel, holding on to the territories would result in a continuation of the hostile situation on the borders of Israel. Having fought wars, and conducted diplomacy for decades, Israel has determined the goals and commitments of its enemies. With justification, Israel is secured militarily against aggression by its immediate neighbors. The likelihood of an attack by Jordan and Egypt are remote. The newly democratic Lebanese government is also unlikely to attack either. This has left Israel with only diplomatic concerns and solutions for the aggressions still aimed against it mostly from Palestinian sources. Having negotiated in good faith, Israel found that its offer to meet almost 90% of the Palestinian demands was still not enough to guarantee Israeli security. Palestinian intransigence over any sort of compromise means that Israeli policy must be dictated by its own interests. Being the victor traditionally means that a negotiated diplomacy goes at least 51% in your favor. Having been willing to accept only a 10% favorable diplomatic solution and still be denied, Israel is justified in choosing to act unilaterally in solving the Palestinian demands.
For the Palestinian leadership, being stateless, holding Zionism as the root of all problems they face, and demanding a return of all properties after fifty-seven years, has been their reason for existence and unification. Having faced a displacement similar to that suffered by the Jews centuries before, the Palestinians have simply resorted to claims of poverty and unjust treatment at the hands of Zionists. In spite of the massive global aid and gifts that are showered annually upon the Palestinian peoples, their leadership choose to live in squalid refugee camps and funnel much of the aid into clandestine military purchases. Having not proven themselves willing to improve their people’s plight except by use of force, they have in essence forced the decision of the Israeli government. The irony is that the Palestinians are about to benefit from the collapse of Zionism as a political force in Israel.
Even a decade ago, the idea that Israel might willingly give up the captured territories for the benefit of the Palestinians would have been unthinkable. However, while the enemies of Israel have rallied around the evils of Zionism, Israel itself had never truly adopted anything remotely resembling the zeal of radical Zionism. While the adoption of militarism was deemed Zionism during Israel’s birth, Zionism never became part of the other social and political structures of Israeli life. Cosmopolitan in nature, Arab and Christian citizens of Israel find equality in the political and economic processes alongside Jews. The idea of a Jew only citizenry was never adopted. Though Zionism had developed into demands for an ultra-nationalist Jewish state, it never happened. So never having gotten much more than lip service from the leaders of Israel, Zionism had not been a factor in policy. What is more, Zionism failed to remain a strong force in Israel’s development because world wide Jewry failed to return that would have made Zionism necessary. When faced with this reality, no one should be surprised that Israel acting unilaterally has chosen to implement a policy that makes sense only if one recognizes that Zionism has not been the motive force behind Israeli policy for many years.
It must be a horrible shock to the Palestinian leadership to realize that one of their chief complaints against Israel has ceased to be a factor. If anyone needs Zionism, it is the Palestinians. However, the growth of democratic institutions world wide as well as the recognition of the inhumanity of discrimination based on race and creed snuffed out Zionism as a consideration among Jewish leadership. Today the Palestinians are left without support politically that they had depended on. Having called for a homeland and independent governance, the Palestinian leadership is about to be handed the territories. This retreat by Israel will remove the excuses Palestinians have relied on to remain impoverished and stateless in their camps. The Palestinian diplomatic stand on territories and Right of Return has been skewered by the fact that they now have the territories free and clear of Israeli control. While they might still declare Israeli actions to be motivated by Zionism, it will be hard to make the claim stick anymore because no Zionist would ever consider turning over any portion of Palestine.
The next few years will see the likely magnification of the Jewish historical trait of dispersal vs. statehood. In spite of Israel’s existence, far more Jews still live outside Israel than inside it. Having existed for centuries without a homeland, Jews worldwide can be comfortable in not returning to Israel because of the marked decline of hostility aimed at them. It is therefore a possible and feasible path of Israeli governmental policy not to aggressively hold every square mile of Palestinian territory for the sake of Israeli security. The Palestinians are facing the reality that their reason for existence, i.e. stateless, poverty stricken, and anti-Zionists, can now be controlled by their own actions. They will have the land and official governmental organs that are due any self-governing people. Having the Israeli example of development of resources and economics to live up to, the Palestinians will either have to duplicate the results or fail. Without Zionism as a rally point, Palestinians will have to figure out a way to live up to their potential without excuse. What has happened is that a people who did not exist before 1948, will have been granted their independence in spite of their own hostile acts.
The Jewish experience could be a library of example for the Palestinians to follow. In less than a century, the Palestinians are being given back their independence. They still have freedom to access their holy sites. About the Dome of the Rock, they have the remarkable gift of a Jewish state, which declined the opportunity to rebuild its most holy site. They have a hand of friendship offered to them by an enemy, which has placed Palestinian interests before their own. The Palestinians should grab this gift and make a success of all it offers. The resulting outcome can be measured by what the Palestinian government chooses to focus on. If they continue to demand a Right of Return, Jerusalem as the Palestinian capitol, permit terror groups to attack Israel, and keep their people impoverished then the world may question legitimately if the Israeli government’s choice to treat Palestinians as equal is wrong. The Palestinians owe a significant debt to the Jews of the world who did not respond to Zionism and return. However, they should not presume that appeals to Zionism, as reason for Palestinian failures will reach receptive ears.
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