The least definable result of withdrawal from Iraq by United States lead forces would be prestige. During a war, the parties involved delay the overall political and diplomatic costs derived from military engagement. Depending on the outcome, the increase or decrease to prestige that results is almost exclusively based on the perceived net result. Prestige is simply the perception by other political entities as to the overall capacity of a nation to exert political or diplomatic power.
In the case of Iraq, the prestige at risk of being gained or lost by the United States is largely dependent on the perception that the Iraq government is fully functional, peaceful, and independent of an overt need to rely on the United States in its functioning. Should we leave before the Iraqi government is fully functional and independent, world opinion will rightly decide that the United States has lost prestige in the process of removing and failing to establish a counter to the former Baathist dictatorship.
The delayed nature of negative impact for loosing prestige will be huge in many ways. On the economic front, the loss of prestige will likely be reflected in the further decline of the U.S. Dollar’s valuation relative to other currencies. It would not be an unlikely decline to see the dollar exceed a three to one ratio against the Euro. What is more, you would likely see that energy traded globally will no longer be conducted in dollar transactions. There would be other such economic costs, however, these two alone would have a staggering effect on our own domestic economy. The fact that the dollar’s valuation is dependent upon perceived strength of the United States government instead of hard assets backing means that if the government of the United States losses prestige the dollar resultantly will be seen by other economic interests as being less valuable. The alternative outcome of a successful conclusion in Iraq consisting of a stable functional and independent Iraq would result in an increase in prestige for the United States. As a result, the dollar would likely find a level of near parity again with the Euro. Something which has not been seen for several years now.
Another result of an Iraqi withdrawal before a functional and independent Iraqi government is emplaced would be a extreme weakening of diplomatic power for the United States. While some have pointedly argued that the current state of Iraq is already undermining United States diplomatic efforts, the opposite is true. American diplomacy right now is seen as a continuation of the immediate post 9/11 efforts. In practice, this policy has been seen as dogmatic and process driven. The United States has been inflexible in its stances in terms of Global Terrorism, Iranian, and North Korean diplomacy. As long as the United States has remained committed to its involvement in Iraq and achieving its publicly stated goals of installing a free and democratic society, the assumption has been made by the rest of the world diplomatic corps that we also continue our position on terrorism, Iran and North Korea.
Should we withdraw from Iraq before we achieve our publicly stated goals for that country, our other policies concerning terrorism, Iran, and North Korea will become suspect. A decline in diplomatic ability will result from a loss of prestige. The seriousness of our diplomatic demands will become checked by the example that a withdrawal from Iraq would give. Considering the diplomatic needs that the United States would have in the aftermath of a withdrawal, the loss of prestige would dramatically lessen our diplomatic ability to enact such goals.
Another result of a lessening of prestige would be the issue of legitimacy in terms of reliability and commitment. If we have called for a free, democratic, capitalistic, and defensible Iraq and then leave before that has become reality, then our future commitments will be called into question. For example the support of the Fatah lead Palestinian Authority would be seen by opposition political groups as being wholly dependent upon the United States willingness to endure only certain levels of conflict of bloodshed. Rightly so by using the Iraq withdrawal as an example, such opposition groups could rightly conclude that if a certain threshold of conflict and bloodshed is surpassed the United States would withdraw its support. The permutations of such declines in diplomatic power due to loss of prestige are relatively easy to postulate. What is important is that the American commitments in the Middle East especially would be suspected by all parties.
In terms of our own penalty for withdrawing on a domestic front, the chief result would be economic. While the globalism we have embraced would lessen the impact of a loss of prestige and its economic consequences, there would still be an overall decline in terms of our GDP potentials comparable to successful Iraqi policy. Domestically sourced and operated enterprises would feel an impact in terms of energy and inflation. While this could be lessened by action of the Federal Reserve Board, the loss of prestige impacting the dollar’s valuation would create a similar economic event as took place following the withdrawal of United States forces and support from South Vietnam. Issues such as a stagnate stock market, expensive lending costs, unemployment, and governmental fiscal crisis would emerge. While temporary in nature, the durations of these effects would likely be longer than that which followed the South Vietnam episode. Of concern is the fact that our national debt, need for international markets, initial weakness of the dollar, and complicit federal deficit budgets are dramatically worse than that which we had in 1974-75. Add to this the impending Baby Boomer medical and retirement crisis and you have a plausible situation where the United States economy could endure several decades of relative decline instead of the decade of decline we endured after leaving South Vietnam.
However you look at it, the loss of prestige and the debit we collectively would incur by withdrawing from Iraq before our public goals are met is not only an endurable expected result but also a relatively painless result for the United States. It would make our economy weaker, but we are after all the world’s biggest economy. It would make our diplomacy harder, but we are the only super power on the globe and there is only so much resistance that can be made against our diplomatic initiatives. The only difficult cost would be the loss of military initiative within the Middle East because our withdrawal indicates that our willingness to enforce our diplomatic goals and not loose prestige does not outweigh our willingness to commit military force.
In terms of the Middle East after an Iraqi withdrawal by the United States the proverbial can of worms would result. It is easy to make sweeping predictions. But, these predictions are so easy that the cause and effects of each, complicit with the nature of future elapsed time span makes it very easy to run off a cliff of suppositions. It is much like the creation of alternative histories which have become popular of late. Knowing what did take place in reality, historians can play with what could have happened if a few minor events or personalities behaved differently given the same initial state. It is easy to figure out what might have happened if a certain Hitler had not survived a gas attack, thus preventing him from ever becoming a political leader. The issue is that sometimes, as you move away from the starting points you can either create an alternate reality that closely mirrors what really did happen or you can create an alternative reality that differs completely from what really happened to such an extent that the alternative becomes laughable. If we are to predict what is likely to happen in the Middle East we have to limit ourselves to very broad guesses. The more general they are, the more valid they can be presumed to be. The more exact we attempt to make them, the more exposed the predictions become to unguessed permutations of events which have yet to take place. What we want is a guess which finds itself somewhere in the middle of events and outcomes with exact dates, names, and consequences and oracles from Delphi.
If the United States pulls out of Iraq without allowing for a Iraqi government that is seen as legitimate by its own people, stable enough to peacefully transfer powers through elections, control commerce and public well being, and defend its internal interest and external borders, the result can be euphemistically referred to as a mess. Assuming none of the United States public policy goals have been met, and it simply withdraws from Iraq, what will result is the development of a factional civil war. While many have made the claim that Iraq is already involved in a civil war, the fact is that it is not currently in such a state. In order for it to be in such a state, the government would have to be using military force against defined adversaries chiefly though actions against civilian populations. What is currently the reality in Iraq is that multiple groups are engaged in tit for tat violence loosely related to regional, tribal, political, and religious affiliations. While there is the occasional spectacular suicide attack or car bomb, the majority of the violent actions in Iraq right now do not fulfill a designed series of military acts entered upon the attainment of political and governmental authority.
As violent as it may seem now, these clashes between tribal groups and religious sects pales in what would occur if the United States left Iraq now. You could compare a post United States withdrawal Iraqi government to the one left in Kabul by the Soviet Union after its withdrawal from Afghanistan. Except the situation for the Iraqi government in Baghdad would be worse since it does not even control the capitol city. Upon a U.S. withdrawal, the stability and endurance of the Iraqi government would depend almost exclusively upon its own military forces and its willingness to use them to effect control over the rest of the nation. While the government might enjoy the diplomatic recognitions by other countries, the fact is that its military simply does not have the trained manpower nor hardware and logistics required to simultaneously control its territorial integrity nor stamp out internal military threat. The almost inevitable independence of the Kurds in a premature U.S. withdrawal environment would leave the Iraqi government with only a firm control of three to four provinces, and titular control only in the Kurdish provinces. In such a situation, the need of the Iraqi government to exert authority would not coincide with the Kurd desire to be politically independent in addition to the functional independence it now enjoys.
Faced with this reality, the Iraqi government would have to decide if it is worth the political cost and military risks involved in retaining the Kurdish provinces. Faced with the necessity to battle the Kurdish peshmurga, the fledgling Iraqi army would be unable to reasonably conclude a military operation against the Kurds before it faced internal opposition in the non-Kurd provinces. It is highly unlikely the Kurds would attack outside the provincial borders, but for all intents and purposes Kurd subservience and recognition of the Iraqi government would persist only as long as the Kurds require a diplomatic shield from Turkish or Iranian actions. Be that as it may, the potential security and resources of the Kurdish provinces would be of no benefit to the Iraqi government other than the fact that the Kurds are unlikely to engage in the civil war that should rage in the rest of the Iraqi republic.
The issue of what will likely start a civil war is hard to predict. It could be as simple as a misguided attempt by the Iraqi government to quell Sunni militancy in a manner similar to that employed by the former regime against Shiites. Another plausible igniter would be Al Queada initiating attacks against both Sunni and Shias that exploit ethnic, regional, tribal, and religious differences as is currently the case. The exception however would be that there would not be a U.S. lead response to Al Queada’s acts as there is now. It would require an Iraqi government response which would at best be limited due to manpower and material inadequacies. The point is that for one reason or multiple responses, the Iraqi government would shortly after withdrawal find itself engaged in a factional civil war.
Aside from the Kurds, who would likely endure a civil war only as defenders, the parties to the Iraq civil war would break down into the Shia dominated outlying provinces, Sunni dominated border provinces along the Saudi Arabia border, and an Iraqi government centered around Baghdad and key provincial capitols and ports of entry. Who would win such an engagement is hard to determine. The more protracted the war the more I am inclined to believe that the Shia provinces will be to co-opt the Iraqi government and eventually liquidate the Sunni civilian populations that remain. However, I can equally see Al Queada taking over the Sunni faction and enlisting Saudi Arabian support that would enable them to eliminate the Iraqi central government and hold the Shia majority faction at bay. In any outcome, Iraq will most probably cease to function as a secular state. It will be unlikely to maintain its economic production, nor maintain even minimal agricultural productivity. It would be a case of transcendent religious factional warfare which would place the Persian Gulf States at odds with the remainder of Arab dominated Middle East countries. It would also allow for Iran to become the de-facto military and economic arbiter of the Middle East.
Assuming that a civil war does break out in Iraq, there would be multiple internal and external consequences. Of immediate consequence to the Iraqi people would be the penalties imposed upon a nation without government and stability. The infrastructure of a modern state, which in Iraq’s case has undergone damages already, would be expected to collapse. Communication would disappear, meaning reliable commercial activity would cease. The chief economic activity of Iraq would become militancy. On a human scale, the direct deaths from combat as well as the indirect deprivations of refugees, famine, and collapsed medical systems would certainly create suffering beyond that of recent memories. If Darfur is a genocide, the words for what would happen in Iraq have yet to be invented.
Outside of Iraq, the consequence of a civil war would be felt quickly. The possibility that Basra would continue shipping oil would vanish. Even if the Iraqi government maintains its control of the port city and facilities, the raw oil would almost certainly not be making it to the shipping depots. On a more sinister side, the religious implications of factions engaged in civil war would drive both a moral wedge between the greater worldwide Islamic community. Assuming the engagement is as protracted as I expect it to be, the plausibility of non-Iraqis engaging in sectarian based violence grows exponentially. What effect such bloodshed would have on the Islamic world can only be guessed at. Having sectarian issues at stake, will the region’s other nations simply sit by and do nothing? I suspect that they would not. That leaves the potential for a regional sectarian conflict open and plausible. In such an environment, the very existence of the current Middle Eastern governments becomes very unlikely. States such as Jordan, Egypt, and Syria would find it almost impossible to resist populist sympathies for the various sectarian combatants in Iraq. Populist sentiment would almost require their governments to act in a militant manner in support of the various sides in Iraq, or risk the requirement of having to use force against their own people. If there is a civil war in Iraq, the expectation that such conflict stays inside Iraq alone is very unlikely.
There is a possibility however that somehow the Iraqi government does survive and does prevent a civil war after a U.S. withdrawal. In order for this to happen, there has to be a willingness to prevent the emergence of sectarian militant groups. It is plausible that issues such as oil sharing, representation, and religious accommodations can be resolved so favorably for all major parties that it becomes inherent self-interest to prevent a civil war from happening. It will also require stringent enforcement of the government’s authority. Having lived under Saddam as an example of oppression and also having near universal access to military equipment the people of Iraq would be capable of quickly judging the government and resisting it if it proves ineffectual. There is a slight possibility that Iraq could operate in a style similar to that of post combat South Korea or some of the post World War II South American nations. Military juntas pay lip service to constitutional authority and law while allowing for economic stability that ultimately leads to a stable enough political landscape that politicians can eventually rule by ballot without needing guns to keep themselves in power. The only issue I see with this slim possibility is that it presumes that there is an Attaturk in Iraq willing to use a unified military command to install a civilian government and protect it until such time as it stands on its own.
Call me a pessimist but I see civil war as the most reasonable outcome. The resultant rump state of Iraq would either be a totally lawless land of sectarian militancy or it would be a religiously based and ideologically purified state. Regardless of the post withdrawal situation in Iraq, the chief benefactor will be the Iranian government. If Iraq finds itself overtaken by a sectarian civil war, Iran is assured of not having any challenge to its Middle East policy, nor would it have to hide its role in encouraging the Shia sects it has been arming, supplying, and providing logistics to. In fact, the need to assure at least a stalemate in an Iraqi civil war would almost certainly assure that Iranian policy would be to circumvent any Sunni security or ascendancy of Al Quaeda leadership and sponsorship of such groups. Additionally the need of Iran’s to do this would also play into its post Islamic Revolutionary goal of thwarting Saudi Arabian influence and support of Sunni religious beliefs.
If by some chance the Iraqi civil war is not long in duration, settling out in a matter months instead of years, it would imply that restraint of violence directed at non-combatants will have likely occurred. By shear numbers, the Shia would most likely be the ones who could adopt such a strategy and survive as compared to their Sunni adversaries. While the nature of such an implementation by the Shia would most reasonably turn out to be one involving ethnic cleansing and genocide, such a strategy would be of direct benefit to Iran. A Shia led genocide in Iraq would assuredly place that sect on an international judgment of immorality. However, for Iran a Shia ascendancy in Iraq would likely lead to a ideologically favorable situation which would allow for Iran to extend if not its actual political borders, at least create a satellite level of control of the Shia who would be the dominant faction in Iraq. The only downfall for Iran in such a situation would be the assumed actions by Saudi Arabia to support the Sunni majority provinces along its current border with Iraq. While a military annexation is highly improbable given the limited on ground absorbing capacity of the Saudi army, the Saudi Royal Airforce would be able to prevent an all out dissolution of the Sunni civilian populations. The situation would still remain favorable to the Iranians however, because any military operations conducted by the Saudis would in very short term become reliant upon United States logistics and supply. Something which would be politically unpopular both in the kingdom and also in the Middle East in general. Add to this the fact that ground support for the Sunnis would likely include direct supply of Al Quaeda, which would substantially erode Saudi-United States relations, Iran could be reasonably sure that Saudi support would ultimately fail in terms of preventing Iranian hegemony in the former Iraqi state.
Even if the Iraqi state avoids a general sectarian civil war or a civil war which engenders a genocidal component, and somehow manages to emerge from an United States withdrawal with a functionally unified yet premature government Iran will benefit. Iran can use the comparative weakness of an Iraqi central government as a provocative reason for crossing the borders towards Basra. Such a move could have multiple excuses of initiation. But the likelihood of an Iraqi force being able to withstand an Iranian annexation would be substantially limited. Given the expected weakness of the United States diplomacy and willingness to use military force again in a region so soon after withdrawal, Iran would likely face no real or overt competition to undo its act. Additionally, even if Iran chooses not to engage in an outright annexation, its support of various Shia militant groups in Iraq would continue to be an attractive goal. While further straining whatever central government Iraq would have, the ultimate expectation would be for an Iranian backed Shia insurgency which would propel the Iraqi nation into a general civil war. And as noted above, the outcome will almost certainly benefit the Iranian desire for hegemony. The only real question is how many Iraqis would die in the process.
So you would have an American state suffering diplomatically and economically An Iraqi state left with either a premature government or a varied degreed civil war inside the Iraqi borders. And an Iranian involvement inside those borders with a reasonable goal and chance to implement a friendly Shia state composed of the majority of the former Iraqi territory. What remains to be determined is how the general geo-political situation will turn in the Middle East after a premature United States withdrawal from Iraq.
Arguably and obviously the one state that benefits most from an American withdrawal is Iran. The time it takes for Iran to establish economic, political, and military hegemony in the region is dependent upon the overall situation in Iraq after an American withdrawal. A worst case scenario for Iran is that the withdrawal of American forces comes only after political, economic, and military stability have been achieved by the Iraqi government. Something that the American voters and media are not likely to support given the low level of popular support for the American contingent in Iraq and the perception of the American people that whatever is happening in Iraq is not a direct event that accrues any defensive benefit to America as a nation.
I can hardly argue with this point of view. The ultimate benefits of a free, stable, secular, and democratically ruled Iraq will reveal themselves in terms of decades and not years. While Americans generally agree with the idea that all people should be free, they tend to lose interest in the process when the people we assume to want freedom as we understand it do little obvious effort to indeed make themselves free. In crass terms, the American public has reached a point where they demand a result and a justification for why it should suffer further military casualties when they perceive that the people we are fighting for are showing little positive efforts to help themselves be free. It is all well and good to have someone say that if we succeed in planting a true democracy in the middle of the Middle East then we could expect many positive things for the peoples of the entire region. But for Americans, that often does not explain why we have to suffer for someone else's benefit.
And it is this inability or unwillingness on the part of America's people that could deal the Iranians a strong hand of cards. The current political infighting in Iraq seems to point to a situation where the withdrawal of American support is already a guaranteed event. The election of a Democrat to the office of the Presidency in 2008 will almost certainly result in a withdrawal time-table of months. Even if there is a Republican elected, the withdrawal from Iraq will not likely be delayed more than a year of time. For Iran, the ability to influence the American political process is the first card that it has to put into play.
Whether Iraq has a government that is stable, a civil war of short duration, or a civil war which leads to total disintegration of Iraq as a functional state, Iran's methodology can remain what it is right now. Funding, training, and supplying insurgents inside Iraq has allowed it to destabilize the Iraqi state already. By increasing these processes and coordinating them to coincide with the American electoral process, Iran can achieve both weakness inside Iraq and punctuate the political campaigns in America with reminders of American futility in Iraq. Regardless of which party taking office in 2008, Iran will have been able to create a situational advantage for itself inside Iraq by either emboldening the Shia to usurp the government of Iraq or assure the continued instability of the functions of the Iraqi government so that there has been no net improvement in the metrics that the American voters use to determine their electoral choice. By simply continuing its current policies inside Iraq, Iran assures itself that the least gain is a American President elected by the people to end its Iraqi involvement. The more likely outcome is that not only has it assured a favorable to Iran outcome in the American election, but also prevented any Iraqi unity government from functioning. The tri-fecta for Iran is the two preceding benefits coupled with an actual Shia dominated civil war.
The first card played by Iran was of course fairly easy to predict. It is after all simply a minor extrapolation of its current confirmed activities. That these activities coincide with both the American electoral process and the impending demands by the American voters to withdraw is lucky for Iran's ultimate intents. It is these ultimate intents that we now consider. Assuming that America has withdrawn, and that the Iraqi government remains functionally incapable, on of the first things Iran may do is work with Turkey concerning the Kurds. The current incursions by Turkey into Iraqi territory, and the Iraqi governments acquiescence has placed the Kurd dominated northern part of Iraq further into a political drive for full independence. If the Iraqi government is incapable of protecting its sovereignty, the Kurds have reasons to fear the neighboring border countries of Turkey and Iran. The reason for Turkey currently crossing the border into Iraq's Kurdish provinces is that it is attempting to eliminate bases of operation of Kurd rebels that are involved in a low grade ethnic based civil war inside Turkey.
Turkey and Iran have an historical commonality concerning the Kurds. That commonality is the the Kurds as a people have been attacked routinely by both states. It is one of the reasons why the Kurds were grafted into the Iraqi nation. The simple idea was that alone as a land locked nation, the Kurds would be numerically weaker than its aggressive neighbors. By being included in Iraq, the Kurds were afforded a greater degree of political and military protection than would have otherwise have been the case. Despite this, the Kurd minorities across the border in Iran and Turkey continued suffering oppressive actions against them. And inside Iraq, the Kurds were treated harshly as the Baathist Party treated them as potential internal enemies of the state. With the end of the Gulf War, the autonomy seized by the Kurds has had the result of Kurds in Turkey and Iran attempting to assert political freedom and also an intent to unite with the Iraqi Kurd provinces. Given that the Iraqi Kurd provinces are a razor's edge away from declaring their own outright independence from Iraq, the potentiality of a free Kurd state heightens the plausibility that the Kurds inside Iran and Turkey would seek to unify with a free Kurd state. If the Iraqi central government is in collapse or outright civil war, the Kurds would be faced with having to militarily defend its internal border with the rest of Iraq, and also its borders with Iran and Turkey. In such a situation, would the defacto independent Kurdish provinces in Iraq simply declare full sovereignty? And if they do so, would that result in the one thing both Iran and Turkey have tried to prevent for decades? Namely their own Kurd majority provinces uniting to form an all encompassing Kurdish state for this group of people?
That the Kurds will in all likelihood become independent of Iraq is very plausible as is reflected in the above scenarios concerning the American withdrawal and the aftermath in Iraq as a whole. But given that the Kurds are militarily weak in terms of supply and material could they resist an incursion from the south of Iraqi factions, defend its borders with Turkey and Iran, and also ignore the populist Kurdish people's desire to reunite as one nation? Compared to Turkey's military abilities and Iran's abilities, the Kurds could only enjoy the advantage of home field and a tenacity for guerrilla warfare. In a situation where Iraq has collapsed as an organized nation, and where a Kurd state has emerged, the expectation in Iranian and Turkish controlled ethnically Kurdish territories would come to issue. It is very plausible that these people would rise up against the Turkish and Iranian governments. The Iranians and Turks would have a common goal of maintaining their individual territorial sovereignty.
Maintaining that sovereignty would best be solved by a permissive exchange of military tactics and strategic cooperation between Turkey and Iran. Obliterating Kurds as a military threat on the joint Turkish and Iranian border would undoubtedly lead to refugees and beaten Kurd rebel forces south into the newly independent Kurd state. At that point, citing the ongoing nature of internal attacks by Kurds against Turkey and Iran, and the lawless nature of Iraq, it can almost be predicted with certainty that the free Kurd state made up of the former Iraqi provinces would be invaded by a joint force of Turkish and Iranian military. Obstensively the goal would be to pacify further unrest and deal with the human refugee crisis.
I will predict that the Kurds will enjoy a free state for only a brief amount of time. The United States will certainly protest the actions taken by Iran and Turkey. But owing to the American loss of prestige mentioned above and its need to keep its military base in Turkey, the Turks will wind up annexing the Kurd territory it occupies. Iran will also ignore any American threats, and probably present its actions as a humanitarian effort. The benefits of Iran gaining Kurd territory will have to be weighed by Iran to determine if it is better to simply annex the Kurd territory or alternatively declare that they are holding the territory as stewards for the Iraqi government. If the Iraqi government is Shia and besting its Sunni enemies, it is highly probable that Iran would turn over the territory to such an Iraqi government.
In any case that is likely to be the first true naked power play that Iran would attempt post American withdrawal. Another action which assumes a weak or collapsed Iraqi government is redeeming its territorial claims on its southeastern border with Iraq. If there is no government to contend with, it is almost certain that Iran will take over the regions in Iraq directly connected to its Persian Gulf oil facilities. Even if these facilities are non-functioning due to the fact that nothing is internally transiting Iraqi pipelines, Iran taking these facilities assures that whatever faction in Iraq that takes power will have to be favorable to Iran in order to be able to reclaim the Persian Gulf shipping facilities. While there are alternative pipelines towards the Mediterranean or simply shipping exports via trucks to Jordan, the economic necessity of this territory to Iraq's long term future cannot be ignored by anyone attempting to rule Iraq. Iran will be able to prevent any government from establishing legitimacy simply by keeping Iraq's historical port of transit out of its control.
Iran would likely be able to accomplish this very easily. When viewing the alternative between being a prime target in an Iraqi civil war, or sitting out such a war under an Iranian military government. The people would reasonably wait it out under Iranian authority. And again, as was the case concerning what would happen to the Kurds, the Americans would be unable to oppose such an act by Iran. Logistically it would be a nightmarish deployment. The expectation that even Kuwait would allow an American expeditionary force to repel an Iranian incursion into Iraq is highly unlikely. An attempt at a unilateral deployment by American forces from the Persian Gulf would be too tempting an excuse for Iran to declare war on an imperial American act against the Islamic heartland. There is little chance that the world community would challenge the Iranian point of view that this was simply a generous act to protect the future needs of the Iraqi people.
Iran's final card may be the establishment in Iraq of a second Islamic Revolutionary Republic. If Iran has direct occupied control of Iraq's Kurd provinces, controls the Persian Gulf transit facilities, and has enabled the Shia fundamentalist political groups to achieve control of the Iraqi government the plausibility of such an outcome rises dramatically. Given the close ties between the Iraqi Shia populations and Iran's own Shia populations, it is not hard to speculate that a person like Sadr would come out on top of the pile with Iran's direct interventions. At that point further speculation is impossible if you also are trying to be accurately predictive. Can two Islamic Revolutionary states coexist, given the recent history of both nations having been in direct military conflict? I do not know. But I am willing to predict that Iran wants at the very least a neighboring state that cannot impead Iranian goals of becoming the single dominate Islamic state in the world. It is also reasonable to assume that whatever state does emerge, it will accede to Iranian diplomatic agendas, especially the ones centered around removing the Gulf States from the Saudi Arabian sphere of influence and being the chief determiner of oil market outputs from the region.
Of the states most likely to object to Iranian card tricks in Iraq, the Saudis are the obvious standout. The generational distrusts that date back hundreds of years, coupled with the differing official religious beliefs, and the extra-territorial competition in the Persian Gulf exacerbate the fallout from an American withdrawal. As I noted earlier, if the Iraqi state falls into a full civil war, the plight of the Sunnis will become a source of problems for the Saudis. At the very least, its own internal clergy may publicly demand the Saudi government to intervene inside Iraq. And assuming the Saudis do, it will be a huge propaganda victory for the Iranians who will then be able to say that the Saudis are acting for America because America is unable to do it itself.
But there are many problems with such an intervention. Aside from air power, the Saudis have one of the least robust armies in the Middle East. Its chief occupation is being glorified security guards for the widely dispersed and isolated oil facilities. The possibility that it could still guard these facilities and also conduct a ground based military operation deep inside Iraq is doubtful. This would not be a deployment like the one in the Gulf War, where there was a patriotic desperation over the possibility that an Iraqi army might sweep into the almost indefensible Saudi territory. Additionally the Saudis wouldn't be able to rely on a multinational military force that was doing the majority of the defense and fighting. This would be a case where the Saudis would have to independently support a defense of Iraqi Sunnis. It is, aside from air support operations, something the Saudis cannot do without placing both internal security and its vast Persian Gulf territorial limit in jeopardy.
A fully deployed Saudi expeditionary force on the Iraqi bordered Sunni areas would leave Saudi Arabia exposed to Iranian intervention in the Persian Gulf. While this would be mitigated by the presence of American naval forces, the willingness of America to unilaterally defend the Persian Gulf for free access would be questionable if such action was seen to be provocative to the Iranians. Having recently withdrawn from Iraq, would the American people permit its leaders to embroil them in another war in the Middle East? It is especially doubtful because getting into an open conflict with Iran to support Saudi Arabia would almost certainly be billed as a war to defend Saudi Arabian oil for American consumers. Would the American people allow its navy to defend Saudi Arabia is it attempted to invade Iraq to prevent Iranian influence? I suspect not.
The Saudis will be much like the Austro-Hungarian Empire was when it entered a war to defend its honor. Internally, it faces the problems of vast wealth for very few, and an existence on the public dole for most of its youthful population. Its religious police and the mosques from which they are sent into the streets preach a religious extremism which debases common activities of life to blasphemy. The royals are balanced on a knifes edge between pushing its people to western economic success and keeping their religiously backed right to rule intact. And like all politically weak absolute monarchies that have gone before them in history, the Saudis will be forced to act so that the perception of their authority is maintained. If they are absolute monarch by religious right, then when the leaders of the religion proclaim that defense of the Iraqi Sunnis is mandatory, the Saudis will have to acceed to those demands or lay bare the fact that their religious authority to rule no longer exists.
Assuming the Saudis do invade Iraq, it will be a short time before Iran may choose to act. This is mostly because the Saudis have an exceptionally short staying power in terms of field deployment. Assuming there is actual combat, Saudi forces will be stretched thin and unable to rectify supply logistics or redeem damaged equipment and human casualties with replacements. It will be a perfect storm for the Saudi government. Its military deployed to Iraq's civil war torn territory, unable to receive any obvious direct military logistical aid from the United States, dealing with its internal population as religious fervor to support the Sunni cause, and facing its historical enemy across an indefensible border as American naval power cannot intervene the Saudi royal family will be forced to commit itself to an unsustainable policy. I cannot predict how the Saudi government will fall, but I do predict that it will fall.
The Gulf states will of course adhere to the traditional policy that has always guided them concerning its three big neighbors. Whatever happens in Iraq, the Gulf States will most likely not intervene or involve themselves in the matter at all. Whether Iran manages to assert full dominance over the Persian Gulf, or Saudi Arabia manages to maintain the dual controlled status of the gulf, the Gulf States will continue in the roll of businessmen and commodity distributors. Iran has no overt need to directly intervene in their affairs. Saudi Arab will either continue the current status of relations or be so internally fractured that there is no Saudi policy towards its immediate smaller neighbors. It may turn out that when the Iraq issue finally becomes determined, the Gulf States will be the only friendly territories left in the region as far as the United States is concerned.
So that is what I see as the plausible results of an American withdrawal before the Iraqis are fully capable of independence. It is really not that bad a situation for the United States. A little loss of prestige and an economic downturn that last many years. But it isn't a case of total penalty for America. It means that she essentially finds her ability to intervene in Middle Eastern affairs has collapsed. In terms of the ability to intervene with force it remains undiminished. But in terms of diplomacy and geopolitical probability it is unlikely that she could convince either her own people or the global community that force should be used. It also means that seventy five years worth of diplomatic processes ultimately prove to be failed. In the region, the United States will have only the Gulf States, Israel, and perhapses Egypt as friendly nations. The rest will fall under the sway of an Iranian hegemony.
Iraq will of course be the biggest loser of all, unless it somehow finds a way to unify under a single stable government that can avoid civil war and function without direct military support from the United States. It is highly unlikely that the Iraq which emerges will even maintain its current territorial borders. Inside Iraq, the Shia will be in control. Whether that means a control based upon ethnic dictatorship is unclear. And the Kurds will most likely again see an independent state fall away from reality. In terms of human suffering, I see something on the scale of Darfur at a minimum. More reasonable would be a prediction of something on the scale of the Congo. The only mercy is that it might only last for a couple of years. But given the nature of armed conflicts in the Middle East that count their durations in decades, Iraq will probably suffer for many years.
Iran of course is already the winner. All it is waiting for is to see just how premature the American withdrawal is and how much additional advantage will accrue to Iran as a result. In a very real sense, withdrawal from Iraq will mark the point at which the United State first went on the defensive in its War on Terror. It will have lost in Iraq, leaving the biggest propaganda potential for its enemies since 9/11. It virtually assures that Iran will have the ability to act unchecked in the region. It also certainly guarantees that Iran will deploy functional missile capable nuclear weapons. It ill be able to parlay its regional hegemony into a legitimate claim to diplomatic power that ranks it as an equal to the leading western democracies. I have a feeling it will inspire Iran to great things, but in Iran's case great evil will be the results of these great things.
Posts
